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Anna Roberts†
Implicit courtroom stereotypes are an urgent problem. When trial defendants
are African American, as is disproportionately the case, they are vulnerable to implicit fact finder stereotypes that threaten the presumption of innocence: unconscious associations linking the defendants with violence, weaponry, hostility, aggression, immorality, and guilt. Implicit-social-cognition research reveals that one
valuable tool in combating this threat is individuating information—information
that, through methods such as defendant testimony, brings an individual to
unique life.
Yet courts frequently chill defendant testimony by permitting impeachment
by prior conviction. Courts determining whether criminal defendants should be
impeached by their prior convictions use a multifactor test, one factor of which is
“the importance of the defendant’s testimony.” This factor was designed to prevent
defendant testimony from being chilled: if the testimony was important, then impeachment was to be avoided. Now, courts often invert this factor’s meaning: they
find that if the defendant’s testimony is important, the government should be able
to impeach it. The distortion of this factor means not only that impeachment is typically permitted—and defendants frequently silenced—but also that a valuable
opportunity to tackle courtroom bias is lost.
This Article proposes that the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor should be reclaimed as a means for defendants to argue that the individuating
information that their testimony can offer militates against permitting impeachment. When the defendant’s race risks triggering stereotypes that threaten the presumption of innocence, individuation represents a crucial part of the struggle for a
fair trial.
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INTRODUCTION
A recent study of DNA exonerees revealed that, despite their
factual innocence, 91 percent of those with prior convictions
waived their right to testify at trial.1 The most common reason
given by their counsel was the fear of the impact of impeachment

1
John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—
Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud 477, 491 (2008).
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by prior conviction.2 That fear was justified. First, in every case
in which one of the exonerees with a criminal record did testify,
the trial court permitted this type of impeachment;3 second, allowing the jury to learn of a defendant’s criminal record increases the rate of conviction by as much as 27 percent.4 A regime in
which stories of innocence are kept from the fact finder by a wellsupported fear that they will be drowned out through prior conviction impeachment is one that needs scrutiny.
Comparing early opinions on whether impeachment should
be permitted with opinions that postdate the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) reveals that in many instances an important
opportunity for defendants—and fact finders—has been lost. The
restoration of this opportunity offers the potential to combat one
of the most significant threats to courtroom fairness: implicit racial stereotyping.
The early case law emphasized that a paramount consideration in determining whether to permit prior conviction impeachment was whether the defendant would be chilled from testifying.5
Even if prior conviction evidence was probative of the defendant’s
credibility, and even if the probative value outweighed the prejudice, the risk that defendants might be deterred from testifying
weighed heavily against permitting impeachment.6
The case law that followed the enactment of the FRE ostensibly preserved these early themes. “The importance of the defendant’s testimony” is one factor in the multifactor test that most circuits and many states use in conducting the probative/prejudicial
balancing test that the relevant rule of evidence requires.7 Yet
federal and state judges often ignore this factor or treat it as if it
were of little worth.8 Most strikingly, in many instances, judges

2
See id (“In almost all instances in which a defendant with a prior record did not
testify, counsel for the wrongfully convicted defendant indicated that avoiding impeachment was the principal reason the defendant did not take the stand.”).
3
Id at 479.
4
Id at 487 n 39, citing generally Harry Kalven Jr and Hans Zeisel, The American
Jury (Little, Brown 1966).
5
See Part I.B.
6
See text accompanying notes 44–45.
7
For the probative/prejudicial balancing test, see FRE 609(a)(1)(B). For the use of
this particular factor, see text accompanying notes 51, 69.
8
See notes 64–78 and accompanying text. See also Roderick Surratt, PriorConviction Impeachment under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to
Applying the “Balancing” Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 Syracuse L Rev 907, 938, 941
(1980) (noting that the number of opinions in which courts discuss and apply all five factors is “relatively small”).
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invert its root sense: whereas originally the importance of the
defendant’s testimony militated against permitting impeachment—under the theory that important testimony must be
heard—now it often justifies impeachment, under the theory
that important testimony must not go unchallenged.9
The effect of this and other trends in impeachment law has
been to make the granting of motions to impeach by prior conviction the default.10 As shown by the exoneree research, the implications are troubling. When defendants waive their right to
testify because of the fear of impeachment, important information is kept from the fact finder—information that may establish innocence and that may help build a richer factual context
for the fact finder’s decisionmaking.
Research into implicit stereotyping and its amelioration
shows why the collapse of the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor is particularly significant. Implicit racial stereotyping constitutes one of the most significant, and intractable,
threats to courtroom fairness. Those accused of crimes are disproportionately people of color,11 and people of color are frequently targets of implicit racial stereotyping.12 Those put on
trial have the right to the presumption of innocence;13 implicit
racial stereotyping by fact finders threatens that presumption,
because when defendants are African American, unconscious associations are invoked between their race and concepts such as
violence, weaponry, hostility, aggression, immorality,14 and—
most damning of all—criminal guilt.15 And yet, as research into
implicit stereotyping expands from demonstrating the breadth of
the phenomenon to exploring solutions,16 some hope emerges.
Research in the area of social cognition indicates that when fact
finders hear from a member of a stereotyped group, and particularly when they hear information that individuates—or paints a
unique picture of—that person, they are more likely to be able to
9

See text accompanying notes 53–62, 69–73.
See text accompanying notes 133–42.
11 Abbe Smith, Defending Those People, 10 Ohio St J Crim L 277, 287 (2012).
12 See text accompanying notes 181–91.
13 See, for example, Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 (1976).
14 See notes 183–87 and accompanying text.
15 See note 191 and accompanying text.
16 See David M. Amodio and Saaid A. Mendoza, Implicit Intergroup Bias: Cognitive,
Affective, and Motivational Underpinnings, in Bertram Gawronski and B. Keith Payne,
eds, Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications 353,
362 (Guilford 2010) (noting that the “holy grail of implicit race bias research is to change
the underlying associations that form the basis of implicit bias”).
10
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form judgments about that individual that are based on the evidence rather than on stereotypes.17
Forging new connections between impeachment law and the
science of implicit stereotyping, this Article proposes that attorneys reclaim the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor as a vehicle for innovative defense arguments. When defendants are the targets of stereotypes that threaten the
presumption of innocence or the right to a fair trial, those arguments could include the need to preclude prior conviction impeachment because it is vitally important for the fact finder to
hear individuating testimony. This would serve not only to bring
sense back into the multifactor test and to restore a key strand
of case law underlying the rule but also to resist the trend toward the automatic admission of impeachment evidence and the
resulting silencing of defendants.
Part I describes the contemporary rules governing the admission of prior conviction impeachment evidence and their
roots. It illustrates the ways in which a factor that was originally intended to aid defense objections to this evidence has lost its
vitality and, in many instances, become a tool for the prosecution. This and other aspects of impeachment law have created a
situation in which impeachment is routinely permitted and defendants are frequently silenced.
Part II illustrates the particular harms associated with the
weakening of the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor by highlighting the risks of implicit racial stereotyping in the
courtroom. When an African American is on trial, implicit racial
stereotypes threaten the presumption of innocence by allowing
fact finders to assume guilt—or elements of guilt—on the basis
of the defendant’s race.18 When a defendant sits silently in the
courtroom, these assumptions run riot, and efforts at tackling
implicit courtroom bias have thus far had little success. Research into social cognition, however, suggests that individuating information can combat stereotyping.
Part III urges that the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor should be revivified. Restoring its original meaning
will enable courts to give weight to all of the factors in the impeachment test, will transform this factor—and the test—from a
17

See Part III.A.
This Article restricts itself to the consideration of implicit racial stereotypes and
particularly those targeting African Americans, but its arguments are potentially applicable to other stereotyped groups.
18
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mere rubber stamp for impeachment, and will play a role in
combating the extraordinary threat that implicit stereotypes
pose to criminal defendants and to the presumption of innocence. Part IV addresses possible objections.
I. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION AND HOW A DEFENSE
OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST
This Part lays out the relevant aspects of the current federal
rule governing impeachment by prior conviction, as well as its
state analogues. It then describes the case law roots of the federal rule before examining the ways in which a key concern of
that early case law—the risk that permitting impeachment
would keep valuable defendant testimony from the fact finder—
has been neglected. The result of this neglect is that impeachment by prior conviction evidence is easier to achieve and the silencing of the defendant is more likely to result.
A. FRE 609 and Its State Analogues
FRE 609 governs impeachment by prior conviction in the federal courts. Two types of convictions can be admitted into evidence to impeach criminal defendants. The first consists of those
convictions with regard to which “the court can readily determine
that establishing the elements of the crime required proving—or
the [defendant’s] admitting—a dishonest act or false statement.”19
Under FRE 609(a)(2), these must be admitted into evidence.20 The
second, with which this Article is concerned, consists of convictions for crimes that were “punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year.”21 Under FRE 609(a)(1)(B), this type
must be admitted “if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to [the] defendant.”22
Prior convictions are admissible under FRE 609 for the purpose of “attacking a [testifying defendant’s] character for truthfulness.”23 Naturally, there is a risk that they will be used for
other, forbidden purposes, such as creating the inference that if
a defendant “did it once, he did it again,” or that if he “did it

19
20
21
22
23

FRE 609(a)(2).
FRE 609(a)(2).
FRE 609(a)(1).
FRE 609(a)(1)(B).
FRE 609(a).
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once,” it would be best if he were incarcerated.24 The drafters of
FRE 609 were alert to this risk, and they made the standard for
impeaching criminal defendants more exacting than the standard for impeaching other witnesses.25 In addition, defendants are
entitled to jury instructions prohibiting jurors from using this
evidence for these forbidden purposes.26
Supreme Court cases have set parameters for the administration of FRE 609. In Luce v United States,27 for example, the
Court held that if defendants exercise their right not to testify,
they have no right to a subsequent appeal of a decision that they
24 See, for example, Ted Sampsell-Jones, Preventive Detention, Character Evidence,
and the New Criminal Law, 2010 Utah L Rev 723, 732–33.
25 See FRE 609(a)(1)(A) (stating that convictions “punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year . . . must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil
case or in a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant”). FRE 403 allows
judges to exclude evidence only when its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by
the risk of one or more problematic phenomena, including “unfair prejudice.” FRE 403
(emphasis added). See also Joseph M. McLaughlin, Jack B. Weinstein, and Margaret A.
Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United
States Courts § 609.05[3][a] at 609-37 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 2014):

The contrast between a criminal defendant and other witnesses [ ] appears in
the fact that Rule 403 protects witnesses other than a criminal defendant only
against the danger of “unfair prejudice” from evidence of their prior convictions, while Rule 609 more broadly protects the defendant against any “prejudicial effect” of evidence of prior convictions.
(citation omitted). See also United States v Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F3d 33, 46 (1st Cir 2000)
(noting that “Rule 609 . . . is primarily concerned with potential unfairness to a defendant
when his prior convictions are offered”); Jack B. Weinstein, Margaret A. Berger, and
Joseph M. McLaughlin, 3 Weinstein’s Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the
United States Courts and State Courts ¶ 609[04] at 609-42 (Matthew Bender 1996), quoting FRE 609, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1990 Amendments:
The amended Rule 609(a)(1) was intended to resolve problems of fairness by
treating criminal defendants differently from other witnesses. The Advisory
Committee was aware of the “unique risk of prejudice” faced by criminal defendants who want to testify on their own behalf: that prior conviction evidence
will be “misused by a jury as propensity evidence.”
See also Federal Rules of Evidence, S Rep No 93-1277, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 14 (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 7051, 7061 (“[T]he danger of unfair prejudice is far greater
when the accused, as opposed to other witnesses, testifies, because the jury may be prejudiced not merely on the question of credibility but also on the ultimate question of guilt
or innocence.”); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 Emory L J 135, 145–46 (1989) (“The purpose of
the balancing test in Rule 609(a)(1) was to prod defendants to testify.”); People v Allen,
420 NW2d 499, 523 (Mich 1988) (explaining that with nondefendant defense witnesses
and prosecution witnesses, “the only ‘prejudice’ arises out of the fact that the witness
may not be believed, as the nondefendant witness’ general character will not be considered by the jury”).
26 See FRE 105.
27 469 US 38 (1984).
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could be impeached—even if that decision may have led them
not to testify.28
Numerous states have adopted rules that exactly or closely
mirror FRE 609.29 Many have also adopted the limitations on
appellate review of impeachment rulings that Luce established
at the federal level; some, however, have rejected Luce and permit appeals of impeachment rulings even when the defendant
exercised his or her right not to testify.30
The text of FRE 609 gives no guidance to courts with respect
to how they should conduct the required balancing test when
they assess whether felony convictions should be admitted as
impeachment evidence; it gives no guidance, in other words, on
how courts should decide whether “the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to [the] defendant.”31
However, the great majority of federal appellate courts, as well
as many states, have developed versions of a multifactor test.32
This test has its roots in case law that predated and shaped FRE
609. The next Section describes those roots.
B. The Case Law Roots of FRE 609
This Section describes the two key cases underlying FRE
609—Luck v United States33 and Gordon v United States.34 It focuses, in particular, on one of the ideas emphasized in both of
those cases: that courts should be very alert to the risk that
granting motions to impeach by prior conviction might deter defendant testimony and thus might deprive the fact finder of valuable information. These opinions describe this consideration as
one of the most important of the factors—or the most important
of the factors—to weigh. As Part I.C describes, post-FRE case
law has preserved the importance of the defendant’s testimony
as a relevant factor—but its interpretation has greatly reduced
its usefulness to the defense and to the fact finder.

28

Id at 43.
For a helpful summary of state analogues to FRE 609, see Blume, 5 J Empirical
Legal Stud at 499–505 (cited in note 1).
30 See text accompanying note 290.
31 FRE 609(a)(1)(B). The Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 609 also provide no
guidance on this issue.
32 See text accompanying notes 46–51.
33 348 F2d 763 (DC Cir 1965).
34 383 F2d 936 (DC Cir 1967).
29
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1. Luck v United States.
Luck, a 1965 decision from the DC Circuit, served as the
“prototype” for FRE 609(a)(1).35 The case interpreted a provision
of the DC Code, which appeared to permit the impeachment of
any witness on the basis of a criminal conviction.36 The court declared that, in fact, “sound judicial discretion” should operate to
determine whether a defendant could be impeached by a prior
conviction.37 The court repeatedly invoked the risk of chilling a
defendant’s testimony as a reason to refrain from granting a motion to impeach. There might well be, for example, “cases where
the trial judge might think that the cause of truth would be
helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant’s story than
by the defendant’s foregoing that opportunity because of the fear
of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction.”38 The court stated
that when a trial court exercises its discretion, a number of factors might be relevant, including, “above all, the extent to which
it is more important to the search for truth in a particular case
for the jury to hear the defendant’s story than to know of a prior
conviction.”39 The court went on to say that
[t]he goal of a criminal trial is the disposition of the charge
in accordance with the truth. The possibility of a rehearsal
of the defendant’s criminal record in a given case, especially

35 McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at
§ 609App.101[1] at 609App.-21 (cited in note 25) (“In the last few years before the rules
of evidence went into effect, a number of circuits were influenced by the line of cases implementing the 1965 District of Columbia decision in Luck v. United States which ultimately . . . emerged as the prototype for Rule 609(a)(1) and (b).”).
36 DC Code § 14-305 (1961):

No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness, either upon the crossexamination of the witness or by evidence aliunde [that is, extrinsic evidence];
and the party cross-examining him shall not be concluded by his answers as to
such matters.
37

Luck, 348 F2d at 768.
Id. See also id at 768 n 7, quoting Charles T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of
Evidence § 43 at 94 (West 1954) (“On balance it seems that to permit . . . one accused of
crime to tell his story without incurring the overwhelming prejudice likely to ensue from
disclosing past convictions, is a more just, humane and expedient solution.”).
39 Luck, 348 F2d at 769 (emphasis added) (mentioning, in addition, “the nature of
the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, [and] the age and circumstances of
the defendant”) (citation omitted).
38
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if it means that the jury will be left without one version of
the truth, may or may not contribute to that objective.40
2. Gordon v United States.
The DC Circuit further developed its analysis two years later in Gordon, another pre-FRE opinion. Then-Judge Warren
Burger authored the opinion, and in it he announced the aim of
clarifying the issue of prior conviction impeachment,41 motivated
in part by a dissenting opinion written the year before, in which
a colleague of his had stated that “[t]he whole subject [of prior
conviction impeachment] needs further study in the interest of
the integrity of trials for crime.”42 The Gordon court summarized
certain points that were made in Luck, including that a defendant with a criminal record “may ask the court to consider
whether it is more important for the jury to hear his story than
to know about prior convictions in relation to his credibility.”43
Among the many factors that might be relevant to a trial court’s
determination, “[o]ne important consideration is what the effect
will be if the defendant does not testify out of fear of being prejudiced because of impeachment by prior convictions.”44 Indeed,
the need to avoid chilling defendant testimony could trump,
even though the weighing of prejudice and probative value
might seem to favor the prosecution:
Even though a judge might find that the prior convictions are
relevant to credibility and the risk of prejudice to the defendant does not warrant their exclusion, he may nevertheless
conclude that it is more important that the jury have the
benefit of the defendant’s version of the case than to have the
defendant remain silent out of fear of impeachment.45
Thus, Gordon echoed Luck in characterizing the silencing of
a criminal defendant as a possible hindrance to the cause of
truth. Both courts emphasized the risk that, by permitting prior
conviction impeachment, a trial judge might chill important defendant testimony. Indeed, while both courts indicated that trial

40

Id.
Gordon, 383 F2d at 938.
42 Stevens v United States, 370 F2d 485, 486 (DC Cir 1966) (Fahy dissenting). For
the role Stevens played in motivating the Gordon opinion, see Gordon, 383 F2d at 938.
43 Gordon, 383 F2d at 939.
44 Id at 940.
45 Id at 940–41.
41
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judges might consider a number of factors in making their decisions about prior conviction impeachment, they gave this factor
an exalted status: Luck suggested that it was the most important factor of all, and Gordon indicated that, regardless of
the results of the balancing test, it might persuade a court to
preclude this form of impeachment.
C.

The Case Law Roots Become Twisted

This strand of case law was engrafted onto the FRE in 1976
by the Seventh Circuit in United States v Mahone.46 That court
was interpreting a provision of then-new FRE 609 that was, in
all relevant respects, identical to the current FRE 609(a)(1)(B).47
The court presented a slimmed-down, smoothed-out version of
five factors mentioned in Gordon,48 describing them as some of
the considerations that trial courts should weigh:
(1) The impeachment value of the prior crime.
(2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness’ subsequent history.
(3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged
crime.
(4) The importance of the defendant’s testimony.
(5) The centrality of the credibility issue.49
Mahone contained no further discussion of these factors.
Thus, while the factor termed “the importance of the defendant’s
testimony” originated in the discussions in Luck and Gordon of
how vital it was to ensure that the threat of impeachment not
chill defendant testimony, its decontextualized inclusion in
Mahone left it vulnerable to interpretations that departed from
its origins as a protection for the defendant. Similarly, while

46

537 F2d 922 (7th Cir 1976).
Compare FRE 609(a)(1)(B) (stating that evidence of crimes “punishable by death
or by imprisonment for more than one year . . . must be admitted in a criminal case in
which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect”), with Mahone, 537 F2d at 928 (excerpting an early version of FRE
609(a)(1)):
47

[With respect to] attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a
criminal conviction . . . for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence . . .
must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.
48
49

Gordon, 383 F2d at 940–41.
Mahone, 537 F2d at 929.
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Luck and Gordon presented the factor as a consideration that
could trump the result of balancing relevance and prejudice,50 its
inclusion in a list of considerations for a court conducting such a
balancing threatened to remove its status as the most important
consideration—one that stood apart from the balancing—and to
make it instead just one more factor for a court to run through
as it conducts the balancing.
As this Section explores, these threats have been realized. A
multifactor test that includes “the importance of the defendant’s
testimony” or something similar has proved a popular one for
courts to run through as they conduct the FRE 609(a)(1)(B) balancing. All but two of the federal appellate courts have adopted
it.51 The “importance of the defendant’s testimony” no longer is a
trump card but rather sits patiently in the deck as “the fourth
factor.”52 As courts run through the factors, they typically fail to
acknowledge—much less honor—the roots of this factor as a protection for the defendant, and indeed as an opportunity for the
defense to prevent this kind of impeachment, no matter the result of the balancing test. In many instances, the meaning of
this factor has been inverted so that courts take the importance
of the defendant’s testimony as a reason to permit, rather than
prohibit, impeachment. As this Section shows, not only courts—
federal and state—but also defense attorneys and commentators
have distorted or neglected the root meaning of this factor. Part
I.D explores the consequences.
1. Courts and a lost opportunity.
Numerous courts have inverted the meaning of this factor by
treating the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” as a reason
to permit, rather than prohibit, the impeachment of that testimony.53 Nor is this just a case of trial courts using the considerable
50

See text accompanying notes 39, 44–45.
The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and DC
Circuits use this factor or a close variant. See United States v Brito, 427 F3d 53, 64 (1st Cir
2005); United States v Hawley, 554 F2d 50, 53 (2d Cir 1977); United States v Caldwell, 760
F3d 267, 286 (3d Cir 2014); United States v Acosta, 763 F2d 671, 695 n 30 (5th Cir 1985);
United States v Moore, 917 F2d 215, 234 (6th Cir 1990); United States v Causey, 9 F3d
1341, 1344 (7th Cir 1993); United States v Browne, 829 F2d 760, 762–63 (9th Cir 1987);
United States v Smalls, 752 F3d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir 2014); United States v Pritchard, 973
F2d 905, 909 (11th Cir 1992); United States v Jackson, 627 F2d 1198, 1209 (DC Cir 1980).
As discussed below, even judges and lawyers in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits sometimes
use this factor. See text accompanying note 266.
52 See, for example, United States v Darr, 2007 WL 2700064, *1–2 (CD Ill).
53 See Ordover, 38 Emory L J at 199–200 (cited in note 25):
51
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discretion that they are given in making their impeachment decisions—discretion that has been likened to “a wild stallion in
our usually well domesticated barnyard.”54 Several federal circuit courts have inverted the original meaning of this factor—
the Sixth,55 Seventh,56 and Ninth57 Circuits—and district courts
within other circuits—the Second,58 Third,59 Fifth,60 and Tenth61
Circuits—have done the same.62
In a less radical break from the factor’s roots—but still a
significant one, given the emphasis in early case law on the importance of this factor63—other federal opinions give it little or
no weight. Even though these opinions may lay out the full list
Where the defendant’s testimony is crucial to the defense, one might expect
that the courts would give serious attention to the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test
that places the burden on the prosecution and favors the defense. Yet, what
seems to occur is that courts will acknowledge that the defendant’s evidence is
important; that credibility is the central issue; and, therefore, the prior conviction must be admitted to impeach the defendant’s credibility. This is the opposite of the policy expressed by the line of authority that led to the adoption of
Rule 609(a).
(citation omitted).
54 State v McClure, 692 P2d 579, 589 (Or 1984), quoting Maurice Rosenberg, The
Discretion of the Trial Judge and Its Implications, 4 Trial Judges’ J 4, 4 (July 1965).
55 See United States v Frazier, 314 Fed Appx 801, 805 (6th Cir 2008).
56 See United States v Nururdin, 8 F3d 1187, 1192 (7th Cir 1993).
57 See Browne, 829 F2d at 763–64; United States v Alexander, 48 F3d 1477, 1489
(9th Cir 1995); United States v Avila-Castorena, 1989 WL 90230, *1 (9th Cir).
58 See, for example, United States v Bumagin, 2015 WL 5725870, *11 (EDNY).
59 See, for example, United States v Rosato, 1999 WL 58577, *3 (ED Pa) (finding the
conviction inadmissible “despite the importance of the Defendant’s testimony and the
centrality of his credibility”).
60 See, for example, Crocker v Dretke, 2003 WL 22410570, *6 (ND Tex) (“Where . . .
a defendant testifies professing his [innocence] and presents no alibi defense, the importance of the defendant’s testimony and his credibility escalates as does the need for
the State to be afforded the opportunity to impeach his credibility.”).
61 See, for example, United States v Willis, 2014 WL 2589475, *2 (ND Okla) (excluding a prior conviction, despite the significance of the defendant’s testimony, because
the multiplicity of witnesses against him indicated that there was “far less of a need for
the government to undermine [the defendant’s] testimony through impeachment”).
62 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have not adopted the Mahone test. For the
Fourth Circuit’s approach, see, for example, United States v Ledingham, 340 Fed Appx
150, 152 (4th Cir 2009) (treating the similarity between the prior conviction and the
charged offense as the only relevant factor); United States v Sanders, 964 F2d 295, 297–
98 (4th Cir 1992) (identifying only the remoteness in time, the similarity to the present
offense, and the bearing “on the likelihood that defendant would testify truthfully” as the
relevant factors). For the approach among district courts in the Eighth Circuit, see, for
example, United States v O’Neil, 839 F Supp 2d 1030, 1035–36 (SD Iowa 2011) (considering only whether the prior conviction contained “any element of dishonesty,” the “similarity between this Defendant’s prior conviction and the current charge against him,”
and the lapse of time since the prior conviction).
63 See Part I.B.

848

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:835

of factors, when it comes time to apply the factors they often
omit any application of the “importance” factor.64 In many opinions, interpretations of the fifth factor—the “centrality of the
credibility issue”—contribute to the weakness of the importance
factor. Opinions often treat these two factors as virtually synonymous,65 merge their analyses under one heading,66 or indicate
that the two factors are a “wash”67 and cancel each other out,
since even if the importance of the defendant’s testimony were to
militate against permitting impeachment, the centrality of the
credibility issue would necessarily push in the other direction—
in a way that makes them both a nullity.68
In the many states that use something like the “importance
of the defendant’s testimony” factor in interpreting their versions of FRE 609, opinions display similar inversions and abandonments of that factor’s root meaning. The highest courts of at
least twenty states apply a version of this factor,69 and one sees
within those twenty states the same tendencies as in the federal

64 See, for example, United States v Harper, 2010 WL 1507869, *5 (ED Wis); United
States v Pettiford, 238 FRD 33, 41–43 (DDC 2006); United States v Grove, 844 F Supp
1495, 1497–98 (D Utah 1994); United States v Bean, 1991 WL 26471, *2 (9th Cir).
65 See, for example, United States v Stolica, 2010 WL 538233, *2 (SD Ill); THK
America, Inc v NSK, Ltd, 917 F Supp 563, 570–71 (ND Ill 1996).
66 See, for example, United States v Sallins, 1993 WL 427358, *4 (ED Pa) (treating
these factors under one heading); United States v Ketner, 1987 WL 36629, *4 (6th Cir)
(treating these factors together in the same paragraph).
67 Jackson v State, 668 A2d 8, 20 (Md 1995) (Bell dissenting) (“I am prepared to
consider factors (4) and (5) as being a wash, they counterbalance and negate each other.”).
68 See, for example, United States v Jackson, 1995 WL 337067, *2 (ND Ill) (“[T]he
importance of Stephans’ testimony makes the issue of his credibility equally critical and
supports the admission of potentially impeaching evidence.”).
69 These states include Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See, for example, State
v Green, 29 P3d 271, 274 (Ariz 2001); Hubbard v State, 946 SW2d 663, 667 (Ark 1997);
Clay v State, 725 SE2d 260, 272 (Ga 2012); Scalissi v State, 759 NE2d 618, 625 (Ind
2001); State v Redmond, 803 NW2d 112, 123–24 (Iowa 2011); Cure v State, 26 A3d 899,
914, 917 (Md 2011); People v Finley, 431 NW2d 19, 22 (Mich 1988); State v Swanson, 707
NW2d 645, 654 (Minn 2006); Johnson v State, 666 S2d 499, 503 (Miss 1995); State v
Hickey, 523 A2d 60, 64 (NH 1986); State v Mora, 950 P2d 789, 803 (NM 1997), recognized
as overruled on other grounds, Kersey v Hatch, 237 P3d 683, 689 (NM 2010); State v
Stewart, 646 NW2d 712, 716 (ND 2002); Hardiman v State, 798 P2d 222, 224 (Okla Crim
App 1990); McClure, 692 P2d at 585, 588–89; State v Colf, 525 SE2d 246, 248 (SC 2000);
Theus v State, 845 SW2d 874, 880 (Tex Crim App 1992); State v Banner, 717 P2d 1325,
1334 (Utah 1986); State v Brewer, 12 A3d 554, 556–57 (Vt 2010); State v Pam, 659 P2d
454, 459 (Wash 1983), overruled on other grounds, State v Brown, 782 P2d 1013, 1025
(Wash 1989). While the factors are “not necessarily mandated” in South Dakota, they
appear in that state’s case law. State v King, 346 NW2d 750, 751–52 (SD 1984).
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system to invert the meaning of the factor,70 ignore it in application,71 merge it with the fifth factor (the “centrality of the credibility issue”),72 or declare that it and the fifth factor cancel each
other out.73 The Tennessee Supreme Court, while acknowledging
that examination of the factors “may be useful to trial judges in
some cases,” has declined to adopt them.74 The court based its
decision, at least in part, on its rejection of the “importance of
the defendant’s testimony” factor, of which it said the following:
[W]e are somewhat at a loss to know what factors of a murder case render the defendant’s testimony more important
than in others and how to equate that situation with the exercise of the Fifth Amendment [right to testify]. In short, we
reject the use of that factor as having any significance whatsoever in balancing probative value with prejudicial effect.75
As suggested by this quotation, some states have lost sight
of the origins of the factor as a potential trump card: a consideration that could militate against permitting impeachment even
if the probative value of the conviction might outweigh its prejudicial value.76 The Supreme Court of Michigan, even while citing
Luck and Gordon,77 declared that one must line up the factors,
as if in an “equation,” on either the probative value side or the
prejudicial effect side, and that the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor belongs on the prejudicial effect side:
“For purposes of the prejudice factor, only the similarity to the

70 See, for example, Gonzalez v State, 134 S3d 350, 354–55 (Miss App 2013); Fulp v
State, 745 A2d 438, 444 (Md Spec App 2000); Dowdy v State, 672 NE2d 948, 952 (Ind
App 1996).
71 See, for example, Smith v State, 771 SE2d 8, 11–12 (Ga App 2015); State v
Cooper, 687 SE2d 62, 69 (SC App 2009); Stewart, 646 NW2d at 716–17; Sims v State, 766
SW2d 20, 21–22 (Ark App 1989).
72 See, for example, Cure, 26 A3d at 917; Brewer, 12 A3d at 556; Swanson, 707
NW2d at 655–56.
73 See McClure, 692 P2d at 591; Jackson, 668 A2d at 16. The Michigan Supreme
Court, concluding that the importance factor and the credibility factor contradicted each
other, has resolved the issue by excising the credibility factor. Allen, 420 NW2d at 520
(“It is our view that it is the effect on the decisional process if the defendant does not testify which must predominate and so the contradicting ‘credibility contest’ factor must
therefore be eliminated.”).
74 State v Sheffield, 676 SW2d 542, 548 (Tenn 1984).
75 Id at 549.
76 See Part I.B.
77 See Allen, 420 NW2d at 510–12.
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charged offense and the importance of the defendant’s testimony
to the decisional process would be considered.”78
2. Defense briefs and a lost opportunity.
When courts fail to give appropriate weight and meaning to
the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor, it is not
typically because they are rejecting or overlooking powerful arguments from defense counsel. Defense attorneys are implicated
in the lost opportunity represented by this factor because they
often participate in the same distortion and weakening of the
factor that court opinions display. Thus, within numerous circuits—the Third,79 Fifth,80 Sixth,81 Seventh,82 and Ninth83 Circuits—defense attorneys have filed briefs in which the root
meaning of the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor
is inverted. In other words, defense attorneys buy into the notion that the more important the defendant’s testimony, the
more important it is that it be impeached. As a result, they are
left in the bizarre posture of arguing that their clients’ testimony
is “not that particularly important.”84 These briefs seem to ignore or forget that the “importance of the defendant’s testimony”
factor is rooted in their clients’ constitutional right to testify.85
78 Id at 522 (“For purposes of the probativeness side of the equation, only an objective analysis of the degree to which the crime is indicative of veracity and the vintage of
the conviction would be considered, not either party’s need for the evidence.”) (citations
omitted). See also Mich Rule Evid 609(b) (requiring courts to consider “only the age of
the conviction and the degree to which a conviction . . . is indicative of veracity” in determining probative value, and “only the conviction’s similarity to the charged offense
and the possible effects on the decisional process if admitting the evidence causes the
defendant to elect not to testify” in determining prejudicial effect).
79 See, for example, Brief for Appellant, United States v Hundley, Docket No 943196, *12 (3d Cir filed July 11, 1994) (available on Westlaw at 1994 WL 16168058).
80 See, for example, Brief of Defendant-Appellant, United States v Compean, Docket
No 01-50099, *15–16 (5th Cir filed May 25, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL
34155141).
81 See, for example, Final Brief of Defendant/Appellant Thomas Jeffress, United
States v Jeffress, Docket No 06-6510, *27–28 (6th Cir filed Mar 10, 2008) (available on
Westlaw at 2008 WL 4574176).
82 See, for example, United States v Thomas, 79 Fed Appx 908, 914 (7th Cir 2003)
(citing the defendant’s arguments).
83 See, for example, Appellant’s Opening Brief, United States v Martinez-Aguilar,
Docket No 99-50253, *11–12 (9th Cir filed Feb 2, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000
WL 34001874).
84 Id at *11. See also Thomas, 79 Fed Appx at 914 (citing the defendant’s argument
that “his testimony was unimportant”).
85 See, for example, Jackson, 668 A2d at 16 (“Factors four and five are restatements
of the considerations that underlie the Rule: balancing the defendant’s right to testify
against the State’s right to impeach the witness on cross-examination.”).
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They seem to ignore or forget the monumental nature of the decision to testify, in the face of risks that include eviscerating
cross-examination,86 skeptical fact finders,87 possible perjury
charges,88 and steep sentencing enhancements.89 These are risks
that few take,90 and they are generally not taken without good
reason.91 Never mind any of that, these briefs seem to say: the
proffered testimony is not so important that anyone should
bother to impeach it.
The prosecution, too, frequently adopts this inverted meaning,
which leaves it arguing that impeachment needs to be permitted
because the defendant’s proffered testimony is “absolutely crucial,”92 “critical,”93 or the “keystone of his case.”94 Ninth Circuit
prosecutors have taken this position, although they appear to
work from a template that contains a Freudian error, since they
argue that “[t]he importance of [the defendant’s] testimony cannot
86 See United States v Libby, 475 F Supp 2d 73, 93 (DDC 2007) (“[A] defendant’s
choice to testify inevitably presents the possibility of a devastating cross-examination,
while declining to testify may mean that the accused gives up the chance to put the most
probative evidence in his favor before the jury.”).
87 See Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 BC L Rev 563,
576–77 (2014).
88 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80
NYU L Rev 1449, 1460 (2005) (“Even truthful defendants risk perjury charges and sentencing enhancements by contradicting the government’s evidence.”).
89 For examples of courts upholding sentencing enhancements for perjury, see
United States v Dunnigan, 507 US 87, 96–98 (1993); United States v Grayson, 438 US 41,
54–55 (1978).
90 See Surratt, 31 Syracuse L Rev at 912 (cited in note 8) (“Because of the widespread belief that jurors are incapable of complying with the limiting instruction, it is
well known that defense attorneys frequently advise their clients who have criminal records not to take the stand.”) (quotation marks omitted).
91 See, for example, Charles E. Feldmann, Should a Criminal Defendant Testify?
(Feldmann Nagel, LLC, Sept 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/A7GT-34FE (“In my
experience, there would have to be a very good reason, above and beyond my client’s innocence, for [testifying] to be a good idea.”); Frederick Leatherman, Will the Defendant
Testify or Not Testify? (Frederick Leatherman Law Blog, July 6, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/L9C9-89BT (“I advised my clients not to testify, unless there was some
specific reason why I believed they had to testify.”).
92 Brief for Appellee United States, United States v Dunn, Docket No 99-50641, *18
(9th Cir filed Feb 22, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000 WL 34001422). See also Brief
for the United States, United States v Taylor, Docket No 98-4141, *46 (11th Cir filed
Mar 4, 1999) (available on Westlaw at 1999 WL 33643277) (arguing that the defendant’s testimony was important to his nullification defense and that it therefore justified impeachment).
93 Brief for the United States, United States v Colon, Docket No 10-15099, *50
(11th Cir filed May 17, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 2118492) (arguing that
one defendant’s testimony was “critical to establishing his lack of intent”).
94 Brief for Appellee, United States v Agtuca, Docket No 94-30257, *33 (9th Cir filed
Mar 29, 1995) (available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 17116196).
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be understated [sic].”95 As part of its arsenal, the prosecution is
using a factor originally designed to assist the defense;96 the fact
that in doing so it relies on a template—and a typographically
erroneous one at that—suggests that it may be encountering little resistance from the other side.
Even when defense attorneys refrain from inverting the root
meaning of this factor, they often fail to give it proper weight
and meaning. Defense briefs frequently ignore the factor97 or
merge it with the credibility factor.98
One recent case illustrates the extent to which defense attorneys have given up on the usefulness of the “importance of
the defendant’s testimony” factor. A defense brief in the Seventh
Circuit—the home of Mahone—argued that both the fourth and
fifth factors should be excised,99 since their effect is to “ensure
prior convictions will be admitted.”100
3. Commentators and a lost opportunity.
Numerous commentators have also given up on the usefulness of this factor to both the defense and the fact finder. One of
the leading contemporary scholars of prior conviction impeachment—Professor Jeffrey Bellin—cites a number of commentators

95 Brief for Appellee United States, United States v Torres, Docket No 03-50589,
*18 (9th Cir filed Apr 2, 2004) (available on Westlaw at 2004 WL 1125611) (“The importance of Torres’ testimony cannot be understated. He was the only witness to testify
at trial who could tell the jury whether or not he knew there was an alien concealed in
the vehicle.”). See also Brief for Appellee United States, United States v Aguila-Montes
de Oca, Docket No 05-50170, *29 (9th Cir filed Sept 27, 2005) (available on Westlaw at
2005 WL 3577835) (“The importance of Aguila’s testimony cannot be understated: it was
crucial given his denial of intent to commit the crime. He was the only witness to testify
at trial who could tell the jury whether or not he intended to enter the United States.”).
96 See Part I.B.
97 See, for example, Brief of Appellant, United States v Mayes, Docket No 01-60095,
*14–15 (5th Cir filed May 30, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 34154604).
98 See, for example, Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, United States v Parks,
Docket No 90-50189, *33 (9th Cir filed Oct 24, 1990) (available on Westlaw at 1990 WL
10534042) (“[T]he defendant’s credibility (factors 4 and 5) was not the central issue in
the case.”); Defendant’s Brief, United States v Perkins, Docket No 88-5237, *33 (9th Cir
filed June 29, 1990) (available on Westlaw at 1990 WL 10084595) (stating that the court
must “determine the importance of the defendant’s testimony in the light of the centrality of the credibility issues”).
99 Brief and Required Short Appendix of Appellant Lamar Tucker, United States v
Tucker, Docket No 13-1403, *29–30 (7th Cir filed July 10, 2013) (available on Westlaw at
2013 WL 3803045).
100 Id at *29.
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who have been skeptical about the factor’s operability,101 but he
then goes further, declaring that the factor, “as originally intended, is rendered meaningless in the wake of Luce.”102 To remedy this, he considers merely “lopping off the fourth and fifth
Mahone factors,”103 but he concludes that despite the fact that
there are “undoubtedly serious substantive flaws in the fourth
and fifth Mahone factors, the excision of these factors would
leave more subtle underlying flaws untouched.”104 He therefore
advocates getting rid of the Mahone factors altogether, in favor
of a new analysis that is “miles from the current state of the federal case law”105 and that does not inquire into the importance
vel non of the defendant’s testimony.106

101 Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door
to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 UC Davis L Rev 289,
318–19 (2008), citing Ordover, 38 Emory L J at 199 (cited in note 25), and Surratt, 31
Syracuse L Rev at 942–45 (cited in note 8):

Soon after Mahone was decided . . . [c]ommentators noted that Mahone’s fourth
and fifth factors, “the importance of the defendant’s testimony” and “the centrality of the credibility issue,” not only lacked explicit legislative authorization, but also could not be applied in a “principled” manner. In essence, the factors cancel each other out. To the extent a defendant’s testimony is “important”
(for example, if the defendant is the key defense witness), his credibility becomes “central” in equal degree, leading to a curious equipoise. . . . Thus, the
fourth and fifth Mahone factors seemed to have no practical significance at all,
existing in a rough state of equipoise that prevented either factor from impacting the overall impeachment calculus.
(citations omitted).
102 Bellin, 42 UC Davis L Rev at 323 (cited in note 101). Bellin bases this claim on
the fact that if a trial court delays its decision on prior conviction impeachment until the
defendant has already testified, the trial court will not need to consider the risk that the
defendant’s testimony will be chilled. Id. In addition, what Bellin calls the “retooled”
post-Luce version of the factor is, in his view, “essentially meaningless as an analytical
consideration,” since it involves defendant testimony routinely being found important
and therefore routinely weighing in favor of permitting prior conviction impeachment. Id
at 328. For a response to Bellin’s points, see Part IV.A.
103 Bellin, 42 UC Davis L Rev at 336 (cited in note 101).
104 Id.
105 Id at 339.
106 Id at 336–39:
Starting on a clean slate unencumbered by the Mahone factors, a trial court,
evaluating the admissibility of a defendant’s prior convictions as impeachment,
could focus on the task at hand: identifying the aspects of each conviction and
the facts of the particular case that could potentially justify the counterintuitive conclusion that a prior conviction’s “probative value” as impeachment outweighs its “prejudicial effect to the accused.”
Professor Victor J. Gold has also given up on the usefulness of the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor, declaring that consideration of “the need for an accused’s
testimony should the threat of conviction impeachment deter him from taking the stand”
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The relationship between the “importance of the defendant’s
testimony” factor and the “centrality of the credibility issue” factor has been of particular concern to commentators. Professor
Roderick Surratt has stated that “[w]hen one [of these two factors] increases in importance, the other does also, and there appears to be no principled way to determine which factor should
prevail.”107 In addition, he argues that both factors can make
hearings at which the judge decides whether impeachment will
be permitted “substantially more complex,” since they require
the conscientious judge to learn “something about the substance
of the expected testimony.”108 This places a burden on the court,
since “the hearing is more complex and more time-consuming
than it otherwise would be,” and on the defendant, who may
have to give a detailed “preview” of his or her anticipated trial
testimony.109 Surratt therefore urges the abandonment of both
the fourth and fifth factors.110 More recently, Professor Ted
Sampsell-Jones has declared that “[a]t best, the fourth and fifth
factors are mostly meaningless. At worst, they confuse courts
and distract from the real issues that should be considered.”111
4. Lost opportunity even when the factor’s root meaning is
preserved.
To be sure, some federal circuit courts,112 federal district
courts,113 state courts,114 defense briefs,115 prosecutors,116 and
should “no longer be of consequence.” Charles Alan Wright and Victor J. Gold, 28 Federal
Practice and Procedure § 6134 at 255 n 77 (Thomson Reuters 2012).
107 Surratt, 31 Syracuse L Rev at 945 (cited in note 8).
108 Id.
109 Id at 946.
110 Id at 942.
111 Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 Minn L Rev 1327, 1362
(2009). See also id at 1367–69 (proposing that the five-factor test be replaced with a
“two-sided balancing test” involving the balancing of probative value against prejudice).
112 See, for example, Caldwell, 760 F3d at 287–88, quoting McLaughlin, Weinstein,
and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at § 609.05[3][e] at 609-43 to -44 (cited in
note 25) (“[T]he fact that a defendant’s testimony is important to demonstrate the validity of his or her defense constitutes a factor weighing against the admission of a prior
conviction.”); Causey, 9 F3d at 1344 (finding that the fact that the defendant “did not obviously need to testify” weighed in favor of the admission of prior conviction); Jackson,
627 F2d at 1209–10 (finding that the importance of the defendant’s testimony “weigh[ed]
against admissibility” of a prior conviction).
113 See text accompanying notes 118–24.
114 See text accompanying notes 125–30.
115 See, for example, Reply Brief for Appellant, United States v Brinkley, Docket No
96-1911, *6 (3d Cir filed Mar 11, 1997) (available on Westlaw at 1996 WL 33581528),
quoting Gordon, 383 F2d at 939 (“[T]he cause of truth would be helped more by letting
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commentators117 do adhere to the root meaning of the “importance
of the defendant’s testimony” factor; in other words, they treat the
importance of the testimony as a reason to exclude the prior convictions. At least some courts within the Second,118 Third,119 Seventh,120 Ninth,121 Tenth,122 Eleventh,123 and DC Circuits124 hew to
the original sense of this factor. The Oregon Supreme Court has
noted that “[i]f the testimony of the accused is crucial to a fair determination of the issues . . . then this [importance of the defendant’s testimony] factor tends to favor exclusion.”125 Michigan,126
Minnesota,127 Mississippi,128 Utah,129 and Vermont130 have taken
the same approach. And the judge who literally wrote the book
the jury hear the defendant’s story than by the defendant’s foregoing that opportunity
because of the fear of prejudice.”) (quotation marks omitted).
116 See, for example, Brief of Appellee, United States v Sindram, Docket No 97-4039,
*29 (4th Cir filed June 17, 1997) (available on Westlaw at 1997 WL 33492764) (“Sindram
Government Brief”) (“[A]lthough the defendant’s testimony was important to advance
the defendant’s claim, the defendant’s testimony also put the issue of his credibility dead
center in the case.”).
117 See text accompanying note 131.
118 See, for example, United States v Brown, 606 F Supp 2d 306, 320 (EDNY 2009).
119 See, for example, United States v Holmes, 2008 WL 5378276, *2 (WD Pa), citing
McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at § 609.05[3][e] at
609-43 to -44 (cited in note 25) (“As the Defendant’s testimony may be the most crucial
testimony at trial (should he choose to testify) and possibly the only testimony on behalf
of his defense, this factor weighs against admission of the prior convictions.”).
120 See, for example, Darr, 2007 WL 2700064 at *2; United States v Piker, 2006 WL
2524130, *2 (CD Ill); United States v Smith, 181 F Supp 2d 904, 910 (ND Ill 2002).
121 See, for example, United States v Chant, 1997 WL 231105, *9 (ND Cal).
122 See, for example, United States v Reece, 797 F Supp 843, 848 (D Colo 1992).
123 See, for example, Brief of Appellant Robert James Collier, United States v Collier,
Docket No 99-00063, *9–10 (11th Cir filed July 24, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000
WL 34221042).
124 See, for example, United States v Coleman, 1991 WL 277334, *1 (DDC).
125 McClure, 692 P2d at 585.
126 See, for example, People v Snyder, 835 NW2d 608, 611 (Mich App 2013), quoting
Allen, 420 NW2d at 522 (“Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that prejudice . . .
escalate[s] with . . . increased importance of the [defendant’s] testimony to the decisional
process.”) (quotation marks omitted); Snyder, 835 NW2d at 613, quoting Allen, 420
NW2d at 524 (“[W]ith regard to the importance of the defendant’s testimony to the decisional process, the Allen Court concluded that prejudice increased where, as here, the
defendant’s testimony was very important to the decisional process, as he had no other
means of presenting his version of events.”) (quotation marks omitted).
127 See, for example, State v Gassler, 505 NW2d 62, 67 (Minn 1993).
128 See, for example, Bogard v State, 624 S2d 1313, 1317 (Miss 1993); Jordan v
State, 592 S2d 522, 523 (Miss 1991).
129 See, for example, Banner, 717 P2d at 1334–35; State v Martinez, 2001 WL
311191, *2 (Utah App) (“Finally, the credibility of the witness warranted exclusion as
defendant’s testimony was of primary import in this case and no decisive nontestimonial
evidence was presented.”).
130 See, for example, State v Gardner, 433 A2d 249, 252 (Vt 1981).
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on evidence—Judge Jack Weinstein—describes this factor as one
that, if satisfied, militates in favor of exclusion of the proffered
conviction:
A defendant’s decision about whether to testify may be
based in part on whether prior convictions will be admitted
for impeachment. Thus, the fact that a defendant’s testimony is important to demonstrate the validity of his or her defense constitutes a factor weighing against the admission of
a prior conviction. If, on the other hand, the defense can establish the subject matter of the defendant’s testimony by
other means, the defendant’s testimony is less necessary, so
a prior conviction is more likely to be admitted.131
Even when these participants in the interpretive process
adopt the understanding that when the defendant’s testimony is
important, care should be taken lest it be kept from the fact
finder, none of them has yet proclaimed the potential usefulness
of this factor that this Article brings to light. None of them has
suggested the use of this factor to discuss the importance of the
defendant’s testimony as a way to combat implicit stereotyping,132 a topic that is introduced in Part II.
D. The Consequences for Defendant Testimony and Trial
Thanks to the distortions mentioned above, as well as other
doctrinal trends discussed below, the ease with which proffered
convictions are admitted for impeachment creates consequences
that are harmful for both defendants and fact finders.
Admission of prior convictions for impeachment has become
the default.133 Prosecutors frequently proffer them,134 and judges

131 McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at
§ 609.05[3][e] at 609-43 to -44 (cited in note 25) (citations omitted).
132 A review of all state and federal briefs available on Westlaw as of November 20,
2015, revealed that there were no examples of attorneys arguing that the possible dilution of implicit stereotypes or other implicit biases could constitute part of what makes
defendant testimony important.
133 See Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 484 (cited in note 1) (“[When] judges are supposed to permit impeachment only if the probative value outweighs the risk of unfairness to
the accused, the balance is routinely struck in favor of impeachment.”); id at 490–91:

In every single case in which a defendant with a prior record testified, the trial
court permitted the prosecution to impeach the defendant with his or her prior
convictions. Although some of the prior convictions involved “false statement”
crimes that were automatically admissible impeachment material, in most cases,
the trial court made the determination that the probative value of the evidence
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generally permit them.135 The dispute is typically less about
whether prior convictions will be admitted and more about how
many of their details will be admitted.136
The distortions mentioned above, which prevent the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor from providing a
meaningful check on impeachment by prior conviction, are mirrored by other ways in which doctrine has shifted toward the
admissibility of these convictions. With respect to the third factor—the “similarity between the past crime and the charged
crime”137—the case law from which the Mahone test developed
viewed similarity as something that militated against admissibility,138 because it increased the risk that the conviction would
be interpreted as relevant to a defendant’s propensity to commit
that crime, rather than to a defendant’s credibility.139 Some
courts, however, have interpreted similarity as a reason to favor
admissibility.140 Similarly, with respect to the fifth factor—the

was not outweighed by prejudice to the accused; this was true even when the
defendant’s prior conviction was for the same or a very similar offense.
(citations omitted). See also Kenneth S. Broun, ed, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 42 at 276
(Thomson Reuters 7th ed 2013) (“Most prosecutors argue forcefully that it is misleading
to permit the accused to implicitly portray himself as having led a blameless life, and
this argument has prevailed widely.”); Pettiford, 238 FRD at 42 (referring to “the general
trend towards admissibility under Rule 609(a)”).
134 See Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 486 (cited in note 1).
135 See id at 484.
136 FRE 609 itself does not prescribe the type or amount of evidence to be admitted.
FRE 609(a) (referring only to “evidence of a criminal conviction”). Typically, federal
courts permit the name of the crime, the date of the crime, and the sentence imposed.
See, for example, United States v Smith, 454 F3d 707, 716 (7th Cir 2006) (stating that a
proponent is limited to “identify[ing] the particular felony charged, the date, and the disposition of a prior conviction”).
137 Mahone, 537 F2d at 929.
138 See Ed Gainor, Note, Character Evidence by Any Other Name . . . : A Proposal to
Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction under Rule 609, 58 Geo Wash L Rev 762, 772
(1990); McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at
§ 609.05[3][d] at 609-42 (cited in note 25) (“When a prior crime committed by an accused
criminal defendant is similar to the one with which the defendant is charged, the prejudicial effect of a prior conviction admitted for impeachment may well outweigh its probative value. Consequently, prior convictions for the same or similar crimes are admitted
sparingly.”).
139 See Sampsell-Jones, 2010 Utah L Rev at 734 (cited in note 24) (noting that one of
the primary modern rationales for character evidence rules is “based on a concern that
juries will find the defendant guilty of the discrete charged act, but that they will do so
relying too heavily on the inference that because he did something bad in the past, he
probably did this as well”).
140 See, for example, United States v Wallace, 848 F2d 1464, 1473 (9th Cir 1988)
(finding that the district court’s analysis, which, inter alia, treated similarity as a factor
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“centrality of the credibility issue”141—some courts have transformed it into a factor that automatically favors the prosecution,
by concluding that credibility is a central issue in every case in
which a defendant testifies.142
The widespread admission of proffered convictions, paired
with the apparent ineffectiveness of limiting instructions,143
means that many defendants—even those with stories of innocence to tell—remain silent rather than risk being impeached by
criminal convictions that might otherwise be kept private.144
This silence may take the form either of a plea bargain in lieu of
a trial that appears hopeless, or of a trial in which the defendant
does not exercise his or her right to testify.145 This problem affects a great many cases, because a large proportion of defendants have prior felony convictions.146
The silence of criminal defendants has a number of harmful
consequences.147 Governmental conduct and evidence may go unchecked.148 Fact finders may assume guilt based on their desire
favoring impeachment, was an abuse of discretion). See also Gainor, Note, 58 Geo Wash
L Rev at 780–81 & n 112 (cited in note 138).
141 Mahone, 537 F2d at 929.
142 See Gainor, Note, 58 Geo Wash L Rev at 782–83 & nn 124–25 (cited in note 138).
See also, for example, United States v Sanders, 2006 WL 3531462, *2 (ED Pa) (stating
that if the defendant “testifies at trial, his testimony—like that of all defendants who
make this decidedly serious and fundamental voluntary choice—will be important, and
his credibility instantly will become a central issue at trial”); United States v Graves,
2006 WL 1997378, *3 (ED Pa) (“When a defendant testifies, he places his credibility directly at issue.”) (quotation marks omitted); Jackson, 668 A2d at 20 n 5 (Bell dissenting)
(“[F]actor (5) almost always will favor the admissibility of the prior convictions.”).
143 See Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 488 & n 44 (cited in note 1).
144 One recent study of more than three hundred trials in four large counties revealed
statistically significant associations between “the defendant’s testifying at trial and the jury’s learning about the defendant’s prior record.” Theodore Eisenberg and Valerie P. Hans,
Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 Cornell L Rev 1353, 1357, 1367–69 (2009).
145 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1450 (cited in note 88).
146 See Thomas H. Cohen and Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2006 *1–2 (DOJ, July 15, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/E9HK-JCS4
(finding that of state felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties in the country, 43 percent had a felony-conviction record in 2006).
147 For a more thorough analysis of the prevalence of defendant silence, see generally Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev 1449 (cited in note 88); Sampsell-Jones, 93 Minn L Rev 1327
(cited in note 111); Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials through
Legal Rules That Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U Cin L Rev 851 (2008).
148 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1499 (cited in note 88) (noting that if defendants
could speak freely, “[t]he system would [ ] obtain more information about law enforcement and how police behave”); Darryl K. Brown, American Prosecutors’ Powers and Obligations in the Era of Plea Bargaining, in Erik Luna and Marianne L. Wade, eds, The
Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective 200, 204 (Oxford 2012) (“[W]hen pleas replace
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to hear both sides149 and their suspicion—despite instructions to
the contrary150—that silence implies guilt.151 As one court has put
it, this silence places a “burden [ ] upon truth-finding”:152 it deprives the fact finders of information whose importance has been
repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court153 and by lower
court judges.154 The lost testimony may constitute a narrative of
innocence, as demonstrated by Professor John Blume’s recent
study of exonerees who sat silently through the trials at which
they were wrongfully convicted155—the most common reason that
their attorneys gave for their clients’ silence was their fear of
trials, most of the systemic components of public adjudication that serve the objectives of
factual reliability and accurate normative judgment are missing—the jury, evidentiary disclosure, rules of evidence, formal adversarial challenges to state evidence, and so on.”).
149 See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 NC L Rev 501, 518 n 102 (1986), citing David Kairys, Jay
Schulman, and Sid Harring, eds, The Jury System: New Methods for Reducing Prejudice;
A Manual for Lawyers, Legal Workers, and Social Scientists 2 (National Jury Project
1975) (noting studies suggesting that 60 percent of prospective jurors reject the presumption of innocence); James E. Beaver and Steven L. Marques, A Proposal to Modify
the Rule on Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 Temple L Q 585, 609 (1985) (“Jurors
expect innocent defendants to respond to false criminal accusations. From silence jurors
draw an inference of guilt. The defendant who appears to withhold relevant information
is likely to be viewed as guilty.”) (citation omitted).
150 See Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 488 (cited in note 1) (“The jury is likely
to disregard an instruction that this inference is not permissible.”).
151 See Lauren Cusick, Serial’s Big Confession (For the Love of Podcast, Nov 15, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/HJR5-A3NQ (reporting a juror’s answer to the question whether it bothered the jury that the defendant did not take the stand: “Yes, it did. That was
huge. Yeah, that was huge. . . . Why not, if you’re a defendant, why would you not get up
there and defend yourself and try to prove that the State is wrong, that you weren’t there,
that you’re not guilty?”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense
Counsel Overcome Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice System?, 45 Tex
Tech L Rev 315, 358 (2012) (citing empirical evidence that “despite the presumption of
innocence, most jurors believe that those accused of crime are probably guilty, ought to
testify if they are not, and bear the burden of proving their innocence”).
152 Allen, 420 NW2d at 521.
153 See, for example, Rock v Arkansas, 483 US 44, 52 (1987) (“[T]he most important
witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself.”); Ferguson v
Georgia, 365 US 570, 582 (1961) (noting that the defendant “above all others may be in a
position to meet the prosecution’s case”); Green v United States, 365 US 301, 304 (1961)
(“The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant
might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.”).
154 See, for example, United States v Walker, 772 F2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir 1985)
(“Where the very point of a trial is to determine whether an individual was involved in
criminal activity, the testimony of the individual himself must be considered of prime
importance.”); Eisenberg and Hans, 94 Cornell L Rev at 1370 (cited in note 144) (“In the
cases in which defendants testified, judges reported that, on average, defendant testimony was more important than that of the police, of informants, of co-defendants, and of
expert witnesses.”).
155 Blume, 5 J Empirical Legal Stud at 477 (cited in note 1).
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prior conviction impeachment.156 The lost testimony may also
help to bridge the considerable gulf of experience between the
average juror and the average defendant.157 If so, it brings a
number of advantages: it gets closer to the ideal of a jury of one’s
peers, it enhances fact-finding, and it increases the ability of the
juror (and all others in the courtroom who hear the testimony) to
participate in civic discourse in an informed manner.158
Thus, the loss of the opportunity contained within the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor matters, and the
broader silencing effect of widespread impeachment matters.
Part III discusses the possibility that the factor could be revivified, with the effect of lessening this silencing. First, however,
Part II introduces a phenomenon that defendant testimony
might help combat: implicit racial stereotyping in the courtroom.
II. IMPLICIT STEREOTYPES THAT THREATEN TO FILL THE
SILENCE
Part I laid out the ways in which the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor has lost its root meaning, and the silencing of the defendant to which this loss has contributed. It also introduced a variety of harms that result from this silencing.
This Part elaborates on one of those harms. Part II.A describes
the implicit racial stereotyping that fills the silence when fact
finders hear nothing from African American defendants; Part
II.B explains that this stereotyping has no easy solution. Part
III then introduces the notion that urging the importance of the
defendant’s testimony as a possible means of combating this
kind of stereotyping could bring new and useful life back to the
“importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor.

156

Id at 491.
See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1498–99 (cited in note 88) (“[T]he criminal system never gets to know defendants—their voices, identities, motivations, or experiences.”); Rob Walters, Michael Marin, and Mark Curriden, Are We Getting a Jury of Our
Peers?, 68 Tex Bar J 144, 145–46 (2005) (noting the underrepresentation of several demographic groups in the Texas jury system and similar trends in court systems across
the country). For additional discussion of this gulf, see text accompanying notes 197–202.
158 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1499 (cited in note 88) (“If the system was intended to keep society substantially clueless about the people it incarcerates, it could not
have been better designed.”).
157
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Implicit Stereotypes Targeting Criminal Defendants

One of the dangers of silencing defendant testimony is that
when defendants remain silent, implicit—or unconscious159—
stereotypes on the part of the fact finders may spring up to fill
the silence. It does not appear to be the case, in other words,
that when faced with a defendant who exercises his or her right
not to testify, jurors reserve judgment and hold fast to the presumption of innocence while they await the remaining evidence.
Rather, their minds seethe with premature assumptions that, in
the absence of defendant testimony, the defense may have little
chance to dispel.
Stereotypes can be defined as “well-learned sets of associations between some trait and a social group,”160 and implicit stereotypes can be defined as unconscious associations between
particular groups and particular traits.161 Along with implicit attitudes, which are unconscious feelings of warmth or hostility
toward particular groups,162 they fall under the heading of implicit bias,163 which is a type of implicit social cognition.164 Implicit bias is entirely compatible with explicit commitments to
equality.165 Thus, even while explicit expressions of prejudice
159 The meaning of “implicit” in this context is that “we are either unaware of or
mistaken about the source of the thought or feeling.” Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias: A Primer
for Courts *8 (National Center for State Courts, Aug 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/4NUK-BHXN. “Implicit stereotypes are the introspectively unidentified
(or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of qualities to members of a social category. Generally, we are unaware of our implicit stereotypes and may not endorse them upon self-reflection.” Id (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
160 Elizabeth N. Chapman, Anna Kaatz, and Molly Carnes, Physicians and Implicit
Bias: How Doctors May Unwittingly Perpetuate Health Care Disparities, 28 J Gen Int
Med 1504, 1504 (2013).
161 See Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 Conn L Rev 827, 833 (2012) (“‘Implicit biases’ are discriminatory biases based
on either implicit attitudes—feelings that one has about a particular group—or implicit
stereotypes—traits that one associates with a particular group. They are so subtle that
those who hold them may not realize that they do.”) (emphasis and citation omitted).
162 See Kang, Implicit Bias at *8 (cited in note 159) (“Implicit attitudes are introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate
favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects. Generally, we
are unaware of our implicit attitudes and may not endorse them upon self-reflection.”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
163 See Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 833 (cited in note 161).
164 See Kang, Implicit Bias at *1–2 (cited in note 159).
165 See Sophie Lebrecht, et al, Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial Bias, 4 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2009) (“Critically, this sort of implicit [racial] bias does not
correlate with explicit judgments of race—what we say we believe.”); Russell H. Fazio
and Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning
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have generally declined,166 implicit bias has been shown both to
exist in a large proportion of the population167 (and in people
from all walks of life168) and to involve negative attitudes and
stereotypes that are based on ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age,
religion, political affiliation, and numerous other categories.169
Both jurors and judges appear to be as susceptible to implicit bias as others are. As Professor Jerry Kang and his coauthors
put it, the assumption made as to jurors is one of “unexceptionalism”:170 there is no reason why they should be any different
from the rest of the population, which exhibits significant levels
of implicit bias.171 This assumption is supported by findings of
implicit bias among mock jurors172 and among real trial judges.173
Nor is it easy to detect or weed out those fact finders who are
most affected by implicit bias. Since implicit biases are not easily accessible to the conscious mind, voir dire is unequal to the
task of identifying those potential jurors who harbor particularly
high levels of implicit bias.174 In addition, trial judges may have

and Use, 54 Ann Rev Psychology 297, 303 (2003) (“Within the domain of prejudice and stereotypes, the correlations [between implicit and explicit measures] tend to be quite low.”).
166 See Mary E. Wheeler and Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: SocialCognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 Psychological Sci 56, 57 (2005).
167 See Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 850 n 170 (cited in note 161).
168 See id at 834.
169 See id at 848–49.
170 Jerry Kang, et al, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L Rev 1124, 1144
(2012) (“Our default assumption is juror unexceptionalism—given that implicit biases
generally influence decisionmaking, there is no reason to presume that citizens become
immune to the effects of these biases when they serve in the role of jurors.”).
171 See John Tyler Clemons, Note, Blind Injustice: The Supreme Court, Implicit Racial Bias, and the Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, 51 Am Crim L Rev
689, 698–99 (2014):
Research has demonstrated that jurors drawn from the general population do
not shed their implicit racial bias at the doors of the courtroom. Specifically,
research has repeatedly shown that . . . jurors treat members of “outgroups,”
such as those of a different race, more harshly than those jurors perceive to be
substantially like them. Because the majority of juries continue to be all or
predominantly white, such outgroup bias disproportionately disadvantages
minority defendants.
(citations omitted).
172 See Kang, et al, 59 UCLA L Rev at 1142–43 (cited in note 170), citing Tara L.
Mitchell, et al, Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-analytic Review of
Defendant Treatment, 29 L & Hum Behav 621, 627–28 (2005).
173 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L Rev 1195, 1225 (2009) (“[I]mplicit biases are widespread among
judges.”).
174 See Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 Conn L
Rev 1023, 1030 (2008), quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On
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an inflated sense of their own fairness and therefore may be particularly ill-suited to the task of detecting their own implicit biases.175 Finally, aspects of the courtroom setting may enhance
the influence of implicit bias.176
As described in this Section, implicit stereotypes are of particular concern in the context of fact-finding at trial—especially
in a criminal trial. First, they permit prejudgment of a case, or
certain aspects of a case, thus potentially threatening the presumption of innocence.177 Second, they take the most troubling
form—that is, they are the most threatening to the presumption
of innocence—when targeted against a population that is already overrepresented in the criminal-justice system, namely,
people of color (and, in particular, African Americans).178 Third,
implicit biases such as these can affect the very tasks that we
call on fact finders to perform.179 Finally, implicit bias may have
contributed to racial disparities in conviction rates, and the fear

Race, Privacy, and Community (a Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism
and Democracy), 114 Yale L J 1353, 1391 (2005):
[T]he harsh reality for judges conducting voir dire aimed at seating only fair
and impartial jurors is that the jurors themselves may not be able to assist because, as Professor Lawrence has said, “we restrict our own speech because we
cannot bear admitting our own racism.” If true, how can judges posing such
questions, as I have, expect to get valid responses, particularly where an honest response about one’s operative biases requires conscious insight into one’s
unconscious?
(citation omitted).
175 See Rachlinski, et al, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 1225–26 (cited in note 173) (“[W]e
asked a group of judges . . . to rate their ability to ‘avoid racial prejudice in decisionmaking’ relative to other judges. . . . Ninety-seven percent (thirty-five out of thirty-six) of
the judges placed themselves in the top half and fifty percent (eighteen out of thirty-six)
placed themselves in the top quartile.”).
176 See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 Duke L J 345, 380–81 (2007) (noting that judges and juries
may be particularly prone to “stereotype-consistent memory errors” due to “cognitive depletion,” causing them to remember facts through a racially biased filter); Justin D.
Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values in Juries: How “Legal Priming” Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U Cin L Rev 1059, 1068–69 (2005)
(describing how jury members are primed by the cultural norms of the legal system); id
at 1073–74 (suggesting that jurors may be influenced by other jurors’ stereotypes, beliefs, and majoritarian thinking).
177 See Patricia G. Devine and Lindsay B. Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and Prejudice, in Todd D. Nelson, ed, Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and
Discrimination 61, 61 (Psychology 2009) (“[T]he research literature is replete with evidence that stereotypes often result in biased judgments of and behaviors toward targets
of stereotypes.”).
178 See text accompanying notes 181–202.
179 See text accompanying notes 203–10.
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of implicit bias at trial may be contributing to the astonishingly
high rate at which cases are resolved by plea bargains.180
The implicit stereotypes that have been shown to be commonly associated with African Americans are ugly.181 When, as is often the case, these stereotypes threaten to cause fact finders to
prejudge an entire criminal case, or even just part of a criminal
case, they are not just ugly but deeply challenging to the ideal of a
fair trial.182 Research suggests the existence of implicit stereotypes connecting African Americans with violence,183 weaponry,184
hostility,185 aggression,186 and immorality.187 These findings

180 See text accompanying notes 211–12. Roughly 95 percent of felony convictions in
the seventy-five largest counties are the result of guilty pleas. Cohen and Kyckelhahn,
Felony Defendants at *1 (cited in note 146). See also Jonathan A. Rapping, Implicitly Unjust: How Defenders Can Affect Systemic Racist Assumptions, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol
999, 1007 (2013):

[E]ven where people of color exercise their right to go to trial, there is a greater
chance that the fact-finder—whether a jury or a judge—will interpret the facts in
a manner consistent with guilt because of the defendant’s skin color. Therefore,
defendants of color are more likely to plead guilty and to be found guilty at trial
due to forces independent of their own culpability or the merits of the case.
(citation omitted).
181 See notes 183–87 and accompanying text.
182 The presumption of innocence “is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.” Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 503 (1976).
183 See Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 322 (MIT 1999) (“Subliminal exposure to the word Black can prime negative aspects of the African American stereotype such as poor, lazy, and violent in the minds [of] non–African Americans.”).
184 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt, et al, Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J Personality & Soc Psychology 876, 881 (2004) (noting that participants who
saw a black face were quicker to identify “crime-relevant objects” than those who saw a
white face).
185 See Jerry Kang and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of “Affirmative Action”, 94 Cal L Rev 1063, 1085 n 113 (2006) (noting that
shoves and bumps are far more likely to be interpreted as aggressive or hostile when
committed by African Americans than when committed by Caucasians); Ziva Kunda and
Paul Thagard, Forming Impressions from Stereotypes, Traits, and Behaviors: A ParallelConstraint-Satisfaction Theory, 103 Psychological Rev 284, 290 (1996).
186 See Justin D. Levinson, Robert J. Smith, and Danielle M. Young, Devaluing Death:
An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty
States, 89 NYU L Rev 513, 563–64 (2014) (reporting that a sample of jury-eligible citizens
displayed moderate to strong implicit racial stereotypes of black Americans, including aggression); Kang and Banaji, 94 Cal L Rev at 1085 n 113 (cited in note 185); Kunda, Social
Cognition at 347 (cited in note 183) (“[E]xposure to an African American individual may
spontaneously bring to mind traits such as aggressive or criminal which then influence the
interpretation of ambiguous behaviors. A disturbing aspect of this process is that perceivers, from their own perspective, may not realize that they are being prejudiced.”) (citation
omitted).
187 See Paul F. Secord, William Bevan, and Brenda Katz, The Negro Stereotype and
Perceptual Accentuation, 53 J Abnormal Psychology 78, 79 (1956) (reporting the results
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threaten the notion of fair fact-finding not only in cases involving
allegations of violence but also, given implicit and explicit associations between violence and drugs,188 in the very large number of
cases that involve drug allegations.189 They may also threaten the
notion of fair fact-finding in any case in which concerns about the
safety implications of a not guilty verdict influence a fact finder’s
decision.190 More broadly, researchers have demonstrated the
presence of implicit stereotypes linking African Americans to
criminal guilt.191 These findings have devastating implications
for the fairness of all types of criminal cases, assuming that
these stereotypes are not dispelled.
The implicit stereotypes targeted at African Americans are
particularly troubling because they threaten to compound existing racial disparities within the criminal-justice system. It is of
course no coincidence that the population whose rate of criminalization is most grossly inflated—African Americans192—is also the
population against whom the implicit stereotypes most threatening to the presumption of innocence are directed. The same historical and contemporary disparities underlie both phenomena.193
But compounded injustices result: First, as commentators have
noted, merely existing as an African American may mean being
of a study in which African Americans portrayed in photographs were viewed as more
immoral than Caucasians portrayed in similar photographs).
188 See, for example, Ingram v City of Columbus, 185 F3d 579, 588 n 7 (6th Cir 1999).
189 See Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose, and Donald Farole Jr, Felony Sentences
in State Courts, 2006 – Statistical Tables *3 (DOJ, Nov 22, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/XQM5-3PVT (indicating that 33.4 percent of convictions in state courts in
2006 were for drug offenses).
190 See Sampsell-Jones, 2010 Utah L Rev at 734 (cited in note 24) (discussing concerns about juries engaging in “preventive detention”).
191 See Eberhardt, et al, 87 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 889–91 (cited in note
184) (discussing multiple experiments finding a strong “association between blackness
and criminality”); Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 Ohio St J Crim L
187, 190, 207–08 (2010) (demonstrating that mock jurors “held strong associations between Black and Guilty, relative to White and Guilty, and [that] these implicit associations predicted the way mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence”).
192 See Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the
Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 Stan L & Pol Rev 355, 361 (2011) (“African Americans
are 12.7% of the general population, but are 41.3% of the federal and state prison population.”); Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Note, New Frontiers in Fair Lending: Confronting
Lending Discrimination against Ex-Offenders, 80 NYU L Rev 1237, 1258–59 (2005)
(“[P]eople of color—especially African-Americans—are disproportionately arrested and
convicted.”).
193 See, for example, Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317, 370–72 (1987) (discussing the
historical framework of the relationship between black communities and the police).
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deprived of the protection of the layperson’s presumption of innocence and instead being viewed as if on some kind of probation.194
In other words, assumptions of guilt may well have led to the
courtroom presence of a disproportionate number of people of color.195 Second, layered on that disparity is a phenomenon that occurs once inside the courtroom: the implicit stereotypes of the fact
finders threaten the courtroom presumption of innocence.196 Third,
while criminal defendants are disproportionately people of color,197
juries and judges are disproportionately white,198 and a great deal
of implicit bias involves bias against “out-groups”199—that is,
groups that are not one’s own.200 Thus the common defendant–fact
finder pairing of black–white creates particularly fertile ground

194 See Tracy Jan, Q&A: Charles Ogletree on Gates’ Arrest, One Year Later (Boston
Globe, June 30, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/J8EG-W9PF; Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 Minn L
Rev 367, 413 (1996), quoting Ellis Cose, The Rage of a Privileged Class 72 (HarperCollins
1993) (mentioning the “oft-unstated assumption that blacks are still on probation—that
. . . blacks are not necessarily granted a presumption of innocence, competence, or even
complete humanity”).
195 See Naomi Murakawa and Katherine Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence:
The Erasure of Racism in the Study and Practice of Punishment, 44 L & Socy Rev 695,
701 (2010) (“[R]acial power is not the sole province of white bigots to which people of color are subject, but rather a systemic and institutional phenomenon that reproduces racial inequality and the presumption of black and brown criminality.”).
196 See text accompanying notes 203–10.
197 Smith, 10 Ohio St J Crim L at 287 (cited in note 11).
198 For the racial composition of juries, see William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner,
and Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the
Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U Pa J Const L 171, 190–91 & n 99
(2001) (noting that approximately 25 percent of juries in a sample of death penalty cases
had no black members and nearly 70 percent had two or fewer). For the racial composition of the judiciary, see Nicole E. Negowetti, Judicial Decisionmaking, Empathy, and
the Limits of Perception, 47 Akron L Rev 693, 702 (2014) (“As of 2010, federal judges
were . . . more than 80 percent white. . . . In state high courts, 87 percent of judges are
white. In state trial courts, 86 percent of judges are white.”).
199 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69
Cornell L Rev 934, 951 (1984) (“[W]hen the evidence is sparse, jurors are more likely to
attribute guilt to defendants of a different race. Jurors are also more likely to convict
when the victim is of their own race.”) (citation omitted); Kunda, Social Cognition at 348
(cited in note 183) (“The same negative act may be attributed less to the actor’s underlying personality and more to situational forces when the actor belongs to one’s own group
than to an out-group.”).
200 See Lebrecht, et al, 4 PLOS ONE at 1 (cited in note 165) (“People show a negative implicit association with members of a racial group other than their own.”); Samuel
R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and
Dispositional Attributions, 26 Personality & Soc Psychology Bull 1367, 1368 (2000).
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for the operation of implicit stereotypes201 and forms a third layer of unfairness.202
Implicit biases are not harmless mental quirks. Rather, they
affect the key tasks that we rely on fact finders to perform: evaluation of evidence;203 recall of facts;204 and the forming of decisions and judgments,205 including judgments of guilt.206 In addition, stereotypes can affect whether one can envision an
individual (such as a defendant) engaging in certain behavior.207

201 See Rachlinski, et al, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 1222 (cited in note 173) (“Jurors
are drawn from randomly selected adults, and a majority of white jurors will harbor implicit white preferences.”).
202 This is not intended as a complete accounting of the multiple layers of racial unfairness at play in contemporary America.
203 See Levinson, Cai, and Young, 8 Ohio St J Crim L at 190, 207 (cited in note 191);
Justin D. Levinson and Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit
Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W Va L Rev 307, 309–10 (2010)
(“[E]ven the simplest of racial cues introduced into a trial might automatically and unintentionally evoke racial stereotypes, thus affecting the way jurors evaluate evidence.”).
204 See Bertram Gawronski, et al, It’s in the Mind of the Beholder: The Impact of
Stereotypic Associations on Category-Based and Individuating Impression Formation, 39
J Experimental Soc Psychology 16, 17, 22–23, 26–27 (2003) (finding that, in a study concerning the strength of association between “gender” and “career” versus “household,”
implicit-association test scores related to memory performance); Levinson, 57 Duke L J
at 398–401 (cited in note 176) (finding that mock jurors remembered aggression-related
case facts more accurately when faced with an aggressive black actor than when faced
with an aggressive white actor, and that mock jurors sometimes developed false memories of nonexistent facts when those facts were consistent with stereotypes of black men).
205 See Fazio and Olson, 54 Ann Rev Psychology at 305 (cited in note 165) (“[B]oth
implicit and explicit measures can be predictive of judgments and behavior.”); Eugene
Borgida, Laurie A. Rudman, and Laurie L. Manteufel, On the Courtroom Use and Misuse
of Gender Stereotyping Research, 51 J Soc Issues 181, 184 (1995) (noting that “the evidence is compelling that gender stereotypes influence social judgments”); Kang, Implicit
Bias at *4 (cited in note 159) (“[I]mplicit bias predicts how we read the friendliness of
facial expressions . . . [and] predicts more negative evaluations of ambiguous actions by
an African American, which could influence decisionmaking in hard cases.”) (citation
omitted); Rachlinski, et al, 84 Notre Dame L Rev at 1225 (cited in note 173) (“First, implicit biases are widespread among judges. Second, these biases can influence their
judgment.”).
206 See Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicitous Mind, 58 DePaul L
Rev 599, 600–01 (2009) (noting that many Americans have biases that manifest themselves when they “categorize information, remember facts, and make decisions”) (citations omitted); Levinson, Smith, and Young, 89 NYU L Rev at 521 (cited in note 186)
(finding that the higher the levels of implicit racial bias in mock jurors, “the more likely
they were to convict a Black defendant relative to a White defendant”); Levinson and
Young, 112 W Va L Rev at 337 (cited in note 203) (discussing the tendency of mock jurors
to find ambiguous facts about a black suspect more indicative of guilt than similar facts
about a lighter-skinned suspect, and confirming that “participants’ evidence judgments
also predicted their guilty/not guilty verdicts”).
207 Ziva Kunda and Bonnie Sherman-Williams, Stereotypes and the Construal of Individuating Information, 19 Personality & Soc Psychology Bull 90, 97 (1993) (noting that
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Even if it is established that a stereotyped individual did engage
in a particular act, stereotypes “may affect [the act’s] perceived
meaning, antecedents, and causal determinants.”208 Thus, studies
have indicated that participants are more likely to view an individual’s behavior as caused by his or her internal disposition (as
opposed to being caused by external factors) when the behavior is
consistent with a stereotype.209 Weak academic credentials, for example, seem to be attributed more to a lack of ability when an African American person is being assessed than when a Caucasian
person is.210
Given the impact of implicit bias on all of the key functions
of fact finders—including the ultimate function of resolving a
case—it is unsurprising that commentators have pointed to implicit bias as a possible factor contributing to disparities in conviction rates.211 Nor is it only conviction rates at trial that are
implicated. The predominant method of criminal-case resolution—the plea—occurs in the shadow of the trial, and it appears
that the threat of implicit fact finder bias at trial helps to maintain the plea’s predominance.212
stereotypes can lead people to “envision [ ] different targets as engaging in different
behaviors”).
208 Id (giving the example of test failure, which, thanks to ethnic stereotypes, may
be attributed to laziness in the case of an Asian individual or to low ability in the case of
a black individual). See also Margo J. Monteith, Jeffrey W. Sherman, and Patricia G.
Devine, Suppression as a Stereotype Control Strategy, 2 Personality & Soc Psychology
Rev 63, 64 (1998) (“Stereotypes often exert undue influence on evaluations, judgments,
and behaviors. For example, ambiguous behaviors are likely to be interpreted in stereotypic ways.”) (citation omitted); Kunda and Sherman-Williams, 19 Personality & Soc
Psychology Bull at 97 (cited in note 207) (noting that stereotypes influence the “perceived
meaning of the act to the actor”).
209 See Kunda and Thagard, 103 Psychological Rev at 295 (cited in note 185).
210 See id.
211 See Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and
Support for Punitive Policies *15 (The Sentencing Project, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/UB68-WHCB (“[S]tudies of mock jurors have found that a defendant’s
race has some impact on verdicts and sentencing.”); Levinson, Smith, and Young, 89
NYU L Rev at 563–65 (cited in note 186) (suggesting that implicit bias among capital
juries could be responsible for disparities in capital conviction rates).
212 See Andrew Cohen, Confessing While Black: When the Threat of a White Jury Is
an Interrogation Tool (The Marshall Project, Dec 12, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/M7S4-SFCH (exposing the extent to which suspects are pressured into
making a “confession” because of the fear that they will not be given a fair jury); Otis B.
Grant, Rational Choice or Wrongful Discrimination? The Law and Economics of Jury Nullification, 14 Geo Mason U CR L J 145, 175 (2004) (noting that in most criminal cases,
“the defendant evaluates the information and pleads guilty” and that “[f]or blacks this
information includes the racial makeup of the jury, which is usually predominantly white,
and the fact that members of the jury will almost assuredly react negatively upon the stereotype of the dreaded ‘black male criminal’”) (citation omitted); id at 166–67 (noting that,
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Efforts to Remedy Courtroom Fairness

This Section lays out the ways in which—despite interest in
addressing implicit stereotypes in the courtroom and despite the
launch of several initiatives having that aim—severe obstacles
stand in the way of progress, including hesitation about creating
new structures. There is nothing approaching a panacea; rather,
multifaceted efforts, including those that work within existing
structures, are required.
The research findings that indicate the existence of implicit
bias—including implicit fact finder bias—have moved judges,
judicial administrators, scholars, and others to look for ways in
which its threat might be lessened.213 Judicial education has incorporated aspects of implicit-bias research,214 and various task
forces have been formed to develop additional reform proposals.215 Judge Mark Bennett has been a noteworthy pioneer,
introducing a raft of reforms into his courtroom, including a discussion of implicit bias in voir dire, jury instructions on the topic, and a pledge that all jurors must sign, affirming that they
will not decide the case based on biases.216 Another federal judge,
in large part because of negative black stereotypes, “many African-American defendants
know that the public often considers them guilty even though they may not have committed a crime” and that “[c]onsequently, many choose to plea[d] to a lesser offense rather than face a jury that is often overwhelmingly white and hostile”).
213 See, for example, Pamela M. Casey, et al, Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias:
Resources for Education *i, 2 (National Center for State Courts, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/EBZ2-HBLA (describing the results of the two-phase National Campaign
to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America’s State Courts, launched in 2006,
the second phase of which focused on implicit bias, including “the development and delivery of judicial education programs on implicit bias in three states”).
214 See id. The National Judicial College’s model curriculum also has introductory
course materials that are “designed to experientially bring to the consciousness of attendees how their thoughts and actions are based on their culture and background.”
Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal
Sentencing, 57 Drake L Rev 591, 630–31 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
215 The American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section has assembled a task
force to develop jury instructions addressing implicit bias. See Jennifer K. Elek and Paula
Hannaford-Agor, Can Explicit Instructions Reduce Expressions of Implicit Bias? New
Questions following a Test of a Specialized Jury Instruction *6 n 1 (National Center for
State Courts, Apr 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZZD4-XD73. See also generally Implicit Bias Initiative (ABA), archived at http://perma.cc/YRG3-DJSJ. The National Center for State Courts has also compiled a collection of court studies with the aim of educating judges and court administrators about implicit biases. See Gender and Racial
Fairness: Resource Guide (National Center for State Courts), archived at
http://perma.cc/X83C-U2V6.
216 See Kang, et al, 59 UCLA L Rev at 1181–83 (cited in note 170) (“I pledge . . .
[that] I will not decide this case based on biases. This includes gut feelings, prejudices,
stereotypes, personal likes or dislikes, sympathies or generalizations.”).
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Judge Janet Bond Arterton, has described her attempts to address racial bias during voir dire, having concluded that if African
American defendants do not testify, the jurors will “have no
firsthand measure of the men on trial beyond their appearances.”217 At the state court level, one judge in North Carolina—
Judge Louis Trosch Jr—has developed a practice of scheduling
difficult hearings for early in the morning, because of research
suggesting that stress and a lack of time can increase cognitive
errors such as implicit bias.218 Judge Milton Souter, in Alaska,
agreed to give jurors an instruction, proffered by the defense and
based on implicit-bias scholarship, which asked the jurors to attempt a technique called “race switching” before finalizing their
verdict.219 Race switching aims to raise awareness of implicit
stereotyping and involves mentally switching the races of the
parties to probe whether a change in race might lead to a change
in verdict.220 In the case in question, that meant taking the races
of the parties—an African American man was claiming selfdefense in response to an allegation that he assaulted a white
man with a hammer—and switching them, to see whether one’s
intended verdict would remain unchanged.221
These kinds of efforts face huge obstacles. First, implicit bias is a deep-rooted and complex problem,222 to which quick fixes
will always be inapposite. The kinds of racial disparities that
217

Arterton, 40 Conn L Rev at 1029 (cited in note 174). See also id:

I fashioned voir dire questions that emphasized the importance of a trial free
from any racial bias of any form. I asked the jurors to seriously consider the
question of whether they could really carry out their duty to be entirely fair
and impartial to these black defendants or whether they had any inkling of
doubt about their ability to be racially fair and unbiased.
218 See wlulaw, Implicit Bias: MLK Day Speaker Judge Louis A. Trosch ’88 1:23:07–
1:23:51 (Jan 22, 2013), online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8xTXnkqQ
-OQ#t=1h23m07s (visited Nov 9, 2015) (Perma archive unavailable) (showing Trosch
discussing his efforts to address implicit racial bias).
219 See James McComas and Cynthia Strout, Combating the Effects of Racial Stereotyping in Criminal Cases, 23 Champion 22, 24 (Aug 1999) (stating that Souter, in that
case, in agreeing to give the instruction, noted that “he personally engaged in a raceswitching exercise whenever he was called upon to impose a sentence on a member of a
minority race, to insure that he was not being influenced by racial stereotypes”). For the
model jury instruction that inspired the defense’s proposal, see Lee, 81 Minn L Rev at
482 (cited in note 194).
220 See Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the
Criminal Courtroom 258 (NYU 2003).
221 See id at 256–58. The defendant in this case was acquitted. Id at 258.
222 See Casey, et al, Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias at *B-2 to -3 (cited in note
213) (discussing sources of implicit bias that include developmental history, affective experience, culture, and the self).
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contribute to implicit racial stereotyping are centuries old.223 Indications of implicit bias have been detected in children as
young as six years old,224 and this bias is reinforced in a widespread and daily fashion.225 In addition, stereotypes may be hard
to abandon if they help to justify an unequal distribution of resources226 or, indeed, an unequal application of the criminal

223 Erik Olin Wright and Joel Rogers, American Society: How It Really Works 316–30
(W.W. Norton 2d ed 2015) (citing genocide and geographic displacement, slavery, secondclass citizenship, noncitizen labor, and diffuse racial discrimination as forms of racial
oppression that have occurred in America and that help illuminate modern racial inequality in America).
224 Casey, et al, Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias at *B-2 (cited in note 213). See
also Devine and Sharp, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and Prejudice at 62
(cited in note 177) (mentioning a suggestion in the literature that “during socialization, a
culture’s beliefs about various social groups are frequently activated and become well
learned” and that, as a result, “these deep-rooted stereotypes and evaluative biases are
automatically activated, without conscious awareness or intention, in the presence of
members of stereotyped groups (or their symbolic equivalent) and can consequently influence social thought and behavior”); Monteith, Sherman, and Devine, 2 Personality &
Soc Psychology Rev at 64 (cited in note 208) (“The explicit and implicit teachings of social
agents such as parents, peers, or the media ensure that stereotypes will be transmitted
to children at a young age, before they have had opportunities to develop their own personal beliefs based on their own personal experiences.”).
225 See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not
Yet Post-racial Society, 91 NC L Rev 1555, 1560–61 (2013) (“Americans are constantly exposed to negative stereotypes about Blacks. These stereotypes include the idea that
Blacks are lazy people who would rather live on or cheat welfare than work and that
Blacks are often involved in criminal activity.”) (citation omitted); id at 1561 n 33 (“The
media frequently depicts young Black and Brown men as the ones who are mugging other people, scamming people, burglarizing homes, selling drugs, and engaging in drive-by
shootings.”); Robert J. Smith and Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias
on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 Seattle U L Rev 795, 823 (2012) (“The associations that are triggered when people view a person of a particular race are likely the
product of extensive cultural and social learning.”); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the
Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 Harv CR–CL L Rev
1, 26 (2011) (“[P]olice profiling . . . adds legitimacy to private discrimination.”); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J Crim L & Crimin 775, 810 (1999) (“[R]ace-based policing tells the community
that Blacks are presumed to be lawless and are entitled to fewer liberties.”). A coalition
of more than fifteen organizations committed to ending racism “within our lifetime,” including Everyday Democracy and the Southern Poverty Law Center, has included a list of
methods to tackle implicit bias on its website. Given the size of the problem, however, it
seems a long life would be needed to accomplish this goal. See To Uproot the Racial Hierarchy Now (TURHN): A Campaign of the Within Our Lifetime Network to Combat the Impact
of Implicit Bias (Within Our Lifetime), archived at http://perma.cc/VR6U-CWQ2.
226 See Monteith, Sherman, and Devine, 2 Personality & Soc Psychology Rev at 64
(cited in note 208) (“The unequal distribution of resources can be twisted into a picture of
fairness by applying negative stereotypes to disadvantaged groups that serve to justify
the inequality.”).
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laws.227 Second, even judges or court administrators who are eager to address implicit stereotypes may fear that attempting any
sort of solution would make things worse. This is the reason given by Bennett for the failure of his colleagues to adopt his innovations.228 These fears may be bolstered by strands of case law
that suggest that bias should not be discussed in the courtroom,
lest discussion draw attention to it in ways that are unhelpful.229
These fears also receive some support from research finding
that, if handled inappropriately, bias-reduction efforts can backfire.230 Third, in a time of fiscal straitening, the effects of which
have been evident in the court system as elsewhere, innovations
that are anything other than resource neutral are particularly
hard to sell.231 Finally, judicial innovators are not yet able to

227 See Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 395, 408
(2009), quoting David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society 178–79 (Chicago 2001) (“[T]he offender is rendered more and more
abstract, more and more stereotypical, more and more a projected image rather than an
individuated person.”).
228 See Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 859 (cited in note 161).
229 Some courts have barred attorneys from discussing their concerns about bias
with the juries in their cases. See, for example, Daniels v Burke, 83 F3d 760, 766 (6th Cir
1996) (upholding the denial of voir dire questioning related to racial bias); Stanton v Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc, 718 F2d 553, 578–79 (3d Cir 1983) (criticizing an attorney for saying to the jury that he was “concerned about the effect of having black people come to an area where there are not many black people and expecting to get justice
from a jury which is mostly white people”). See also Deborah L. Forman, What Difference
Does It Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA Women’s L J 35, 70 (1992) (“Many
judges refuse to allow probing into sensitive areas that are inevitably the most crucial to
the case, such as racism or sexism.”).
230 See, for example, Katja Corcoran, Tanja Hundhammer, and Thomas Mussweiler,
A Tool for Thought! When Comparative Thinking Reduces Stereotyping Effects, 45 J Experimental Soc Psychology 1008, 1008 (2009) (“[S]ocial perceivers who try to suppress a
stereotype may later be troubled by rebound-effects that make stereotypic content even
more accessible and consequently influence their judgment and behavior in subsequent
tasks.”); Thomas E. Nelson, Michele Acker, and Melvin Manis, Irrepressible Stereotypes,
32 J Experimental Soc Psychology 13, 31 (1996) (“Conscious attempts at thought regulation may [ ] backfire, leading to exaggerated stereotyping under conditions of diminished
capacity, or when self-regulation efforts are relaxed.”).
231 See Jennifer K. Elek and Paula Hannaford-Agor, First, Do No Harm: On Addressing the Problem of Implicit Bias in Juror Decision Making, 49 Ct Rev 190, 195
(2013) (discussing proposals to address implicit juror bias, including administration of
the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to jurors and the addition of race-relevant voir dire
questioning, and concluding that the “[c]osts associated with these techniques”—
including the “printing and processing of questionnaires at a time when states are facing
new and significant budgetary challenges” as well as the “limited existing court resources (e.g., computer access for potential jurors to take the IAT, or trained staff to code
and process a paper-and-pencil version of the test)”—will “preclude these options from
consideration in many jurisdictions”).
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point their hesitant colleagues to empirical work that validates
their efforts. Indeed, the first published study to investigate the
effects of jury instructions like those used by Bennett failed to
demonstrate any significant influence of the instructions on jurors’ verdict preferences.232
Thus, there exists a desire to alleviate the threats to fairness that implicit bias presents in the courtroom, but no panacea. Those who wish to ameliorate this problem need to channel
their energy in multiple and creative directions233 and must pay
particular attention to those methods that require no new structures and no additional resources.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY AS A
WAY TO COMBAT IMPLICIT STEREOTYPING
This Part brings together Part I’s analysis of the lost opportunity within the impeachment context and Part II’s description
of the threat to the presumption of innocence created by implicit
racial stereotyping. It does so by suggesting that one of the unfortunate consequences of the phenomenon described in Part I is
the lack of a forum for arguments that the defendant’s testimony
is important because it has the potential to combat the implicit
stereotyping threatening the right to a fair trial. This Part
draws on a concept from the field of social cognition—
individuation—to suggest that defendant testimony might further this goal as part of a multipart strategy to combat implicit
stereotyping in the courtroom.
Part III.A introduces individuation as a method of combating implicit stereotyping. Part III.B explores the aspects of
232 See Elek and Hannaford-Agor, Can Explicit Instructions Reduce Expressions of
Implicit Bias? at *8, 14 (cited in note 215) (finding “no significant effects . . . on judgments of guilt, confidence, strength of the prosecution’s evidence, or sentence length”
when testing a specialized implicit-bias jury instruction “[b]ased loosely on [the] jury instruction developed and used by Judge Mark Bennett”).
233 For endorsements of these kinds of multipronged strategies, see, for example,
Lee, 91 NC L Rev at 1590–1601 (cited in note 225) (providing a variety of suggestions as
to how prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys can attempt to combat implicit bias
by making race salient); Patricia G. Devine, et al, Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race
Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J Experimental Soc Psychology 1267,
1276 (2012) (describing “compelling and encouraging evidence for the effectiveness of our
multifaceted intervention in promoting enduring reductions in implicit bias”); id at 1277
(noting that it is “likely that there is no single ‘magic bullet’ that, by itself, prompts the
regulation of implicit bias and the multifarious changes in concern and awareness such
self-regulation brings,” and that “[i]nstead, several components likely work in combination to prompt situational awareness of one’s bias and translate that awareness into
chronic awareness, concern, and self-regulatory effort”).
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individuation research that make this concept particularly applicable to defendant testimony. Part III.C conducts that application, laying out the ways in which arguments about individuation might be made under a revivified “importance of the
defendant’s testimony” heading and the advantages that such an
approach might bring.
A.

Introduction to Individuation as a Method of Combating
Bias

Two main categories of information shape one’s impressions
of an individual.234 The first is stereotypes—associations between
particular groups and particular traits.235 The second is individuating information, which encompasses everything else—details
about an individual’s acts, for example, or personality, or life circumstances.236 It is all too easy for stereotypes to dominate the
process of forming impressions about an individual:237 automatic
associations between particular groups and particular traits offer
cognitive shortcuts in the immensely complex task of processing
information.238 Thus, for example, upon encountering an African
American—even for mere milliseconds239—stereotypes that have
accrued in an individual since infancy might come to mind.240
They might include traits such as violence, weaponry, hostility,

234

See Kunda and Thagard, 103 Psychological Rev at 284 (cited in note 185).
See id.
236 See id.
237 See Peter Glick, Cari Zion, and Cynthia Nelson, What Mediates Sex Discrimination in Hiring Decisions?, 55 J Personality & Soc Psychology 178, 179 (1988)
(“[P]erceivers seem to prefer to fit others into a category, if possible, rather than process
information about them in a piecemeal fashion.”).
238 See Nelson, Acker, and Manis, 32 J Experimental Soc Psychology at 13 (cited in
note 230) (“As a standard component of our cognitive repertoire, stereotypes reward their
user with speed and efficiency in perception, inference, and decision-making.”); Casey, et
al, Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias at *1 (cited in note 213) (noting that implicitsocial-cognition research “shows that individuals develop implicit attitudes and stereotypes as a routine process of sorting and categorizing the vast amounts of sensory information they encounter on an ongoing basis”).
239 See Patrick S. Forscher and Patricia G. Devine, Breaking the Prejudice Habit:
Automaticity and Control in the Context of a Long-Term Goal, in Jeffrey W. Sherman,
Bertram Gawronski, and Yaacov Trope, eds, Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind
468, 469 (Guilford 2014) (“Once acquired, the biases are [ ] frequently activated due to
the saturation of stereotypic information within the social environment. These biases
then become overlearned to the point that, even if they are not perfectly automatic, they
are activated as quickly as 300–600 milliseconds after cue onset.”) (citation omitted).
240 See Ziva Kunda, et al, The Dynamic Time Course of Stereotype Activation: Activation, Dissipation, and Resurrection, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology 283, 295 (2002).
235
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aggression, immorality, or guilt.241 In a two-step process, stereotypes that have come to mind (or that have been activated) may
be applied to individuals and thus play a part in forming impressions.242 A lack of individuating information about an individual makes it particularly easy for stereotypes to dominate the
process of forming impressions.243
Individuation is a strategy that “relies on preventing stereotypic inferences by obtaining specific information about group
members.”244 A variety of studies have suggested that individuating information, such as information about an individual’s
background,245 can reduce the influence of stereotypes on the
formation of impressions.246
B.

Applicability of Individuation to Defendants’ Testimony

Various aspects of research into individuation suggest its
potential applicability to the context of defendant testimony and
its potential as a means of attempting to combat the threat of
implicit fact finder stereotypes.
First, individuation research has produced promising findings regarding the ability of individuating information to combat
241

See text accompanying notes 183–87, 191.
See Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 290–91 (cited in note 240).
243 See Kang, et al, 59 UCLA L Rev at 1160 (cited in note 170) (“When we lack sufficient individuating information . . . we have no choice but to rely more heavily on our
schemas.”); Wayne Chan and Gerald A. Mendelsohn, Disentangling Stereotype and Person
Effects: Do Social Stereotypes Bias Observer Judgment of Personality?, 44 J Rsrch Personality 251, 251 (2010) (“When there is no or minimal individuating information about the target, i.e., when group identification constitutes the only differentiating information available, it will necessarily be determining.”); Borgida, Rudman, and Manteufel, 51 J Soc Issues
at 182 (cited in note 205) (“The research to date suggests that stereotypes are more likely
to influence impressions and evaluations when perceivers have either minimal or ambiguous individuating information about a particular person.”).
244 Devine, et al, 48 J Experimental Soc Psychology at 1271 (cited in note 233). See
also id (“Using this strategy helps people evaluate members of the target group based on
personal, rather than group-based, attributes.”).
245 See, for example, Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 284 (cited in
note 240).
246 See, for example, Chan and Mendelsohn, 44 J Rsrch Personality at 255 (cited in
note 243) (finding that individuating information had a strong influence on the study
participants’ descriptions of individuals, even when those individuals were labeled according to their ethnicity and their gender); id at 256 (noting that when details of individuals’ behavior were provided to study participants, stereotypes were attenuated and
participants “anchor[ed] on the individual in making their judgments”); Kunda and
Thagard, 103 Psychological Rev at 291–92 (cited in note 185) (reporting that stereotypes
that otherwise affect study participants’ impressions of an individual’s traits “typically
have no such effects when the individual is [ ] known to have engaged in an unambiguous behavior that is clearly” relevant to the judgment in question).
242
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the implicit stereotyping of African Americans.247 It is the implicit stereotyping of African Americans that appears most threatening to the presumption of innocence, in light of cognitive associations between African Americans and violence, weaponry,
hostility, aggression, immorality, and guilt.248
Second, individuation research has included studies of individuals engaged in the same basic task that defendants perform
on the stand: talking about themselves and their experiences.249
For example, in one study, researchers assessed the extent to
which African American stereotypes held by one group of study
participants had been brought to mind—or “activated”—after just
fifteen seconds of exposure to an African American student.250 The
other group of study participants listened to the African American
student talk about her experiences for twelve minutes before
their levels of stereotype activation were assessed.251 Stereotypes
had been activated after just fifteen seconds, but after twelve
minutes there was no evidence of stereotype activation.252 As the
study’s authors described their results, “[t]he initially activated
stereotype had dissipated over time.”253 In another study, participants read a five-page transcript of a telephone conversation in
which the stereotyped individual described his or her experiences and actions in three situations.254 Having read the conversation, the study participants relied on the details about the individual’s behavior in evaluating his or her traits, rather than on
stereotypes.255
Third, the process of supplying individuating information is
particularly vital when the stereotyped individual is a member

247 See, for example, Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 295 (cited in
note 240).
248 See text accompanying notes 184–91.
249 See, for example, Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 285 (cited in
note 240).
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id at 286.
253 Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 286 (cited in note 240). See
also id at 295 (suggesting that “as the encounter with the stereotyped individual unfolded, participants shifted their attention from this individual’s membership in a stereotyped group to other aspects of this individual or to the task at hand”).
254 Anne Locksley, et al, Sex Stereotypes and Social Judgment, 39 J Personality &
Soc Psychology 821, 822 (1980).
255 See id at 825–26 (noting that there were “no effects of sex stereotypic beliefs on
subjects’ predictions about the target’s personality characteristics”).
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of an out-group vis-à-vis those harboring the stereotypes256—in
other words, when those harboring the stereotype do not belong
to the stereotyped group.257 The process of forming an impression
of someone from a different racial group is particularly likely to
involve a surfeit of attention to stereotypes and a lack of attention to unique characteristics.258 As discussed above, disparities
in both the fact finder pool and the defendant pool mean that
fact finder judgments of criminal defendants frequently involve
an in-group/out-group dynamic and thus an enhanced need for
individuating information.259
Fourth, there is some indication that people pay more attention to individuating information about a stereotyped person
when they are motivated to form an accurate impression of that
person.260 Research into jurors indicates that, in general, they
arrive at the courthouse eager to perform their duties well261 and
thus are likely to feel such motivation.

256 See Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a ColorConscious Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 Am Crim L Rev 1541, 1559 (2012):

Race-based out-grouping has predictable implications . . . (such as whites perceiving blacks as presumptively dangerous and culpable), but also some less
well-recognized consequences. For instance, people tend to notice the unique
and individual characteristics of familiar, in-group members, whereas they are
prone to focus on the stereotypical, group-based characteristics of out-group individuals. When a white person encounters another white, he or she does not
focus on the other’s race, but instead processes the unique, individuating attributes (both physical and personal) of the other person. By contrast, when a
white interacts with a black stranger (or vice versa), psychological processing
of the other is much more likely to emphasize race and attributes that are implicitly associated with race (such as “threat”), and to downplay personal traits
that do not conform to racial stereotypes.
(citations omitted).
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 See text accompanying notes 197–202. See also Levinson, Smith, and Young, 89
NYU L Rev at 565 (cited in note 186) (“One of the social groups for which people show
the strongest and most consistent preferences is the racial in-group.”); id (“[I]n-group
members . . . receive the cognitive benefit of the doubt in a range of [ ] situations, simply
by virtue of their group membership.”).
260 See Kunda, Social Cognition at 366 (cited in note 183).
261 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, 101 Mich L Rev 1387, 1390 (2003)
(“When people are chosen to serve on a jury, they are generally anxious to perform their
task well, and eager for guidance on how to be a good jury.”); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are
Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 L & Contemp Probs 205, 208, 223 (Autumn 1989)
(describing a study in which mock jurors “t[ook] the law seriously”).
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Applying Individuation to the Impeachment Context

This Section proposes that arguments about individuation
could be made under the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor of the impeachment analysis, and it explores the
potential benefits of this opportunity.
While fact finders and criminal defendants would ideally
live in a world where impeachment of criminal defendants with
their prior convictions had been abolished, that is unlikely to
happen in the near future. Many commentators have advocated
its abolition,262 but to no avail.263 So, too, the Mahone factors are
unlikely to be supplanted as the leading means by which courts
resolve the question whether prior conviction impeachment
should be permitted. These factors survived the enactment of
the FRE,264 have been adopted by all but two of the federal circuits,265 have been used even in arguments and decisions in the
two circuits that have not adopted them,266 and have survived

262 See generally, for example, Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 96
BU L Rev (forthcoming 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9XH6-L79Q. See also, for example, Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 Georgetown L J Ann Rev Crim Proc iii, xliii
(2015) (“I’d amend Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) . . . to preclude impeachment of a
criminal defendant . . . with evidence of his past criminal convictions.”); Bellin, 76 U Cin
L Rev at 882–83 (cited in note 147) (proposing the prohibition of “impeachment-only evidence,” such as illegally obtained evidence and prior convictions, in most circumstances);
Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: The Asymmetrical Interaction
between Personality and Situation, 43 Duke L J 816, 825 (1994) (advocating a “simple
rule against character impeachment evidence of a criminal defendant”).
263 See McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at
§ 609App.100 at 609App.-20 (cited in note 25) (“[T]here appears no substantial support for
entirely eliminating proof of all convictions in attacking credibility.”); Surratt, 31 Syracuse
L Rev at 914 (cited in note 8) (noting that the “adoption by most other American jurisdictions” of the Hawaiian ban on prior conviction impeachment, “at least in the near future,
seems unlikely”).
264 See text accompanying notes 46–49.
265 See text accompanying note 51.
266 See, for example, United States v Kieffer, 2009 WL 973350, *2 (D ND) (considering the factors in balancing probative value and prejudicial effect); Brief of Appellant,
United States v Hammond, Docket No 99-4167, *15–16 (4th Cir filed May 25, 1999)
(available on Westlaw at 1999 WL 33616112) (showing the defendant urging the court to
use the factors in balancing probative value and prejudicial effect); Sindram Government Brief at *29 (cited in note 116) (showing the Government urging the court to use
the factors in balancing probative value and prejudicial effect); Appellee’s Brief, United
States v Hamilton, Docket No 93-5393, *30–31 (4th Cir filed Sept 24, 1993) (available on
Westlaw at 1993 WL 13037357) (same); Appellee’s Brief, United States v Stotler, Docket
No 93-5054, *20 (4th Cir filed July 12, 1993) (available on Westlaw at 1993 WL
13119772) (same).
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the arguments of commentators and advocates that some or all
of them should be abandoned.267
As described above, one portion of the case law underlying
Mahone currently lies dormant. It used to offer protection to the
defendant—and to the fact-finding process—by cautioning
against impeachment, even in the face of the results of the
probative/prejudicial balancing test, if the defendant’s testimony
would be important to the process of getting to the truth.268 In
courtrooms where components of criminal charges—and even the
very question of criminal guilt—are being prejudged by fact finders because of implicit stereotypes, the fact-finding process risks
straying very far from the truth and very far from the presumption of innocence.269 This appears to be the case in the disproportionately large group of trials that involve African American defendants, a group whose disproportionate representation in the
courthouse already poses a fairness problem.270
The possibility of clearing a path for arguments about the importance of individuating testimony within the impeachment context offers something that appears to be vital in combating implicit stereotypes, namely, finding methods that do not require
additional resources or new structures.271 Revivifying the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor as one that is available for the defense—and as one that is not viewed as a distraction
267

See text accompanying notes 99–111.
See Part I.B.
269 See John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Bias, in Susan T. Fiske,
Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey, eds, 2 Handbook of Social Psychology 1084,
1085 (Wiley 5th ed 2010) (“In general, stereotypes produce a readiness to perceive behaviors or characteristics associated with the stereotype; when stereotypes are activated,
individual group members are judged in terms of group-based expectations or standards.”); Levinson, Cai, and Young, 8 Ohio St J Crim L at 190, 207–08 (cited in note 191).
See also Part II.A.
270 See, for example, Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1006 (cited in note 180):
268

African-Americans are arrested for drug offenses at an alarmingly higher rate
than their white counterparts, despite similar rates of involvement. . . . Once in
the system, the disparate treatment continues. Prosecutors have ultimate discretion to determine whether to charge an arrestee and, if so, with what
charge. Studies suggest both factors are influenced by the race of the accused.
See also Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: ‘Staggering Disparity’ (USA Today, Nov 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/252R-GDEN (describing how African
Americans are “more likely to be arrested than any other racial group in the USA”);
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears—on the Social
Construction of Threat, 80 Va L Rev 503, 530 (1994) (mentioning the disproportionate
number of African Americans on death row, convicted by juries, and in jail). See also text
accompanying notes 192–202.
271 See text accompanying notes 230–31.
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from “the real issues that should be considered”272 or as one that
merely gets balanced out by the “centrality of the credibility issue” factor273—would both use and help restore meaning to an
existing structure.
This Article therefore proposes that the “importance of the
defendant’s testimony” factor be reclaimed by the defense, and
be taken seriously by the judiciary, as a vehicle for arguments
that have the potential to tackle one of our most pressing courthouse problems. Specifically, this Article proposes that defense
attorneys make creative use of the opportunity to explain that
implicit stereotyping threatens the presumption of innocence, as
well as the accurate determination of the truth.274 It proposes
that in determining, under Mahone, whether permitting impeachment might chill defendant testimony, courts should consider the possibility that defendant testimony would offer the
kind of individuating information that has the potential to combat stereotyping, and courts should weigh this possibility as a
factor militating against allowing impeachment.
This proposal offers additional advantages beyond the restoration of meaning and sense to the Mahone framework and the
countering of implicit stereotyping. For example, even if defense
arguments fail to persuade the court that the individuating potential of the defendant’s testimony should militate against
permitting impeachment, they have significant potential to educate the court about the dangers of implicit stereotyping on the
part of the fact finder. Two of the most prominent members of
the criminal defense bar—Professors Jonathan Rapping and
Bryan Stevenson—have recently advocated the importance of

272

Sampsell-Jones, 93 Minn L Rev at 1362 (cited in note 111).
See text accompanying notes 67–68, 73, 107.
274 This Article is restricted to the consideration of implicit racial stereotypes, and
particularly those targeting African Americans, but its arguments have potential applicability for other stereotyped groups. See, for example, Mary D. Fan, Decentralizing
STD Surveillance: Toward Better Informed Sexual Consent, 12 Yale J Health Pol, L &
Ethics 1, 29–30 (2012):
273

Increased availability of information might shift decisionmakers away from relying on troubling group-based stereotypes, permitting them to make more accurate information-assisted individuated judgments. More reliable information
has the double effect of facilitating more accurate, and less biased, decisionmaking. Judgments are based on individualized assessments, rather than
group stereotypes.
(citation omitted).
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educating courts about implicit bias275 through methods that include motions practice.276 Rapping points out that even if a motion on such a subject were unsuccessful, “the process of making
this request would serve to [ ] educate the court” about implicit
racial bias “and the potentially destructive role it plays in the
fair administration of justice.”277 Stevenson reaches a similar
conclusion.278
A second set of advantages would result if this revivifying of
the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor were to lead
to a greater proportion of defendants testifying, whether they
would otherwise have resolved their cases through guilty pleas
or through trials at which they sat mute. Decreasing the huge
proportion of cases that are resolved through guilty pleas in favor of an increased proportion of cases that go to trial would help
to ensure that the government’s evidence and conduct are subjected to a greater level of scrutiny.279 Decreasing the large proportion of trials at which defendants sit mute, in favor of an increased proportion of trials at which they offer narratives, offers a
number of advantages. First, despite instructions to the contrary,

275 See Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1022–23 (cited in note 180); Ronald J.
Tabak, The Continuing Role of Race in Capital Cases, Notwithstanding President Obama’s
Election, 37 N Ky L Rev 243, 268–69 (2010) (describing suggestions by Stevenson that
“counsel should make change of venue motions based on studies . . . which find that certain types of people are likely to view African Americans as prone to engage in criminal
conduct; automatic but implicit associations of African Americans with other negative
characteristics; and polling data,” and noting that, for example, “defense counsel could
argue that the defendant would have to overcome a presumption of guilt for young men
of color”).
276 See Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1023 (cited in note 180) (“[E]ven if
trial courts are reluctant in the short term to allow defense counsel to pursue all of these
strategies, through the process of demanding and litigating these requests, counsel can
begin to educate the court and raise awareness of this concept.”); id (“While the Supreme
Court has made it difficult to raise the issue of race in the litigation of criminal procedure, [implicit-racial-bias] studies may provide a new avenue through which to do so.”)
(citation omitted); id at 1027 (urging defenders to “look for openings to raise [implicit racial bias] broadly in their motions practice”).
277 Id at 1029–30 (discussing the example of motions asking that potential jurors
take the IAT, a computerized tool designed to raise awareness of implicit bias).
278 Tabak, 37 N Ky L Rev at 269 (cited in note 275) (describing Stevenson’s argument that “even if such a motion loses, by making and litigating the motion you may affect the dynamics and the postures, attitudes, and thinking of everybody involved, including the District Attorney and the judge”). The University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill School of Government has created a manual for comprehensive litigation of
racial-bias issues in North Carolina. See generally Alyson A. Grine and Emily Coward,
Raising Issues of Race in North Carolina Criminal Cases (UNC School of Government,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/FL9P-B46A.
279 See text accompanying note 148.
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invocations of the right to silence appear to lead to assumptions
of guilt.280 Second, as Professor Blume’s research into exonerees
shows, stories of innocence are currently being kept from fact
finders.281 Third, whether or not defendants have stories of innocence to offer, they have details of their lives to offer that may be
essential to a fair resolution of the case and that may be a useful
part of the jurors’ education.282 The life experiences of those who
are able to sit on a jury may well be far removed from those
whose fates they determine.283 A failure to understand the life
experiences of others may destroy both the ideal of a jury of
one’s peers and the reality of a fair judgment.284 One of the leading scholars of the law of evidence—Judge Weinstein285—
concluded that he would be more likely to bring a fair resolution
to a conspiracy case if he visited the housing project at which the
conspiracy was alleged to have occurred.286 Defendant testimony
can offer analogous glimpses of a different life that may assist
fact finders—not only as they make their decisions in the courthouse but also as they play their parts in the broader citizenry,
offering their contributions to policy debates.287

280

See text accompanying notes 149–51.
See text accompanying notes 155–56.
282 See Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury,
74 Fordham L Rev 1683, 1717 (2006).
283 See text accompanying notes 197–98.
284 See Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal
Convictions, 98 Minn L Rev 592, 644–45 (2013).
285 See Joseph M. McLaughlin, Jack B. Weinstein, and Margaret A. Berger, 1
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United States
Courts xxvii (Matthew Bender 2d ed 2014).
286 This was a case resolved by plea and thus without defendant testimony. See Tom
Hays, Veteran Federal Judge Visits Drug Gang’s NYC Turf (USA Today, Mar 5, 2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/7C37-KCV4 (“Weinstein, who’s overseeing the case against
the crack cocaine crew, had decided it was important to leave his chambers, don his dark
overcoat and fedora and visit the defendants’ former turf.”); id (containing the comment
that Weinstein is “unusual”).
287 See Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment at *6 (cited in note 211) (“Black Americans’
negative encounters with the criminal justice system and greater recognition of the root
causes of crime temper their preference for punitive policies. White Americans, by contrast, have less frequent and more positive criminal justice contact, [and] endorse more individualistic causal explanations of crime.”). These gaps in experiences and resulting attitudes could, in some circumstances, be addressed by defendant testimony. See Roberts, 98
Minn L Rev at 644 (cited in note 284) (“Making social realities understood is a step toward their reform.”).
281
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IV. RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
This Part addresses four potential objections to this Article’s
proposals. The first is that developments in the doctrine have
made the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor moot,
and thus that it is not available as a heading under which individuation arguments can be made. The other three objections all
assume that the factor is available for such arguments, but they
question whether its use for such arguments is worthwhile. Specifically, they ask whether there are other means of providing
individuating information that would be just as effective as defendant narratives, whether the proposal’s benefits are outweighed by the risks, and whether this change would affect so
many cases as to place an undue burden on the prosecution.
A.

Case Law Has Not Mooted the Factor

Some commentators and judges are likely to resist the notion that content can be reinserted into the “importance of the
defendant’s testimony” factor, since they view that factor as having become moot in light of the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in
Luce. They point out that as a result of Luce, a defendant has no
right to bring an appeal based on improper impeachment unless
the defendant testifies.288 They argue that since the defendant
will already have testified by the time a viable appeal is mounted, the “importance of the defendant’s testimony” factor can no
longer encompass the question whether permitting impeachment will chill testimony.289
The claims of mootness are misguided. First, several states
do not follow Luce.290 Second, even in those that do, and in the
federal system, trial judges can still ask the question that this
288

Luce, 469 US at 43.
See text accompanying note 102.
290 See, for example, Wallace v State, 160 S3d 1184, 1187 (Miss App 2014); State v
Swanson, 707 NW2d 645, 654 (Minn 2006); State v Whitehead, 517 A2d 373, 377 (NJ
1986); People v Contreras, 108 AD2d 627, 628 (NY App 1985); Commonwealth v Richardson, 500 A2d 1200, 1203–04 (Pa Super 1985); State v McClure, 692 P2d 579, 584 n 4 (Or
1984) (“We respectfully disagree [with Luce]. We prefer the motion in limine practice suggested in our opinion.”). States that do follow Luce include Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut,
Delaware, Iowa, Michigan, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah.
See, for example, State v Wickham, 796 P2d 1354, 1357 (Alaska 1990); State v Allie, 710
P2d 430, 437 (Ariz 1985); State v Harrell, 506 A2d 1041, 1046 (Conn 1986); Fennell v
State, 691 A2d 624, 626 (Del 1997); State v Derby, 800 NW2d 52, 58–60 (Iowa 2011);
People v Finley, 431 NW2d 19, 25 (Mich 1988); State v Hunt, 475 SE2d 722, 726–27 (NC
App 1996); State v Silvia, 898 A2d 707, 720 (RI 2006); State v Glenn, 330 SE2d 285, 286
(SC 1985); State v Gentry, 747 P2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987).
289
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Article urges should be asked: Would permitting impeachment
chill defendant testimony that is important for the fact finder to
hear?
It is certainly true that one could read the language of
Luce—“We hold that to raise and preserve for review the claim
of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant
must testify”291—as prohibiting any sort of objection to impeachment before defendant testimony has begun. Indeed, one
district court has settled on this interpretation, refusing to make
an in limine ruling about prior conviction impeachment.292 This
interpretation is flawed, however, and it has not won out: Luce
itself permitted the making of an in limine motion, but it simply
denied that there was a right to appellate review when the defendant did not testify.293 The district court in United States v
LaTray294 considered, but rightly rejected, a reading of Luce that
would mean that no motion on impeachment could be made in
advance of defendant testimony,295 and numerous other decisions
are in accord. Some courts do not require that the defendant testify before they will issue a final ruling on whether impeachment will be permitted,296 and some go as far as to favor pretrial
resolution of this issue, stating that to delay a ruling would unfairly prejudice the defendant.297 Judge Weinstein recommends
291

Luce, 469 US at 43.
United States v Chew, 1993 WL 38400, *2 (ED Pa) (citing Luce in support of a
pretrial decision to refuse to rule on the admissibility of the defendant’s prior convictions
under FRE 609(a) when the defendant had not yet taken the stand). See also United
States v Campbell, 2009 WL 595980, *5 (ED Tenn) (“[A]ny ruling on the admissibility of
such evidence, [must] necessarily await its attempted admission, if any, at trial and arguments at that time.”).
293 Luce, 469 US at 41 & n 4. See also United States v LaTray, 1989 WL 143355,
*3 (NDNY).
294 1989 WL 143355 (NDNY).
295 Id at *3.
296 See, for example, United States v Smith, 2006 WL 618843, *3 (ED Pa) (granting a
pretrial motion to preclude impeachment by prior conviction); United States v Coleman,
2011 WL 2619543, *10 (D NJ) (deferring a ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions
until the defendant “either announce[d] he intend[ed] to testify, or actually testifie[d]”).
297 See, for example, United States v Savoy, 889 F Supp 2d 78, 118 (DDC 2012)
(“Pre-trial determination of impeachment questions is generally preferable so that the
parties may make strategic decisions accordingly.”); United States v Gatto, 746 F Supp
432, 474 (D NJ 1990), revd on other grounds, 924 F2d 491 (3d Cir 1991) (noting that
“under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this court must determine
[the defendant’s] pretrial motion before trial, unless the court, for good cause, orders that
it be deferred for determination at the trial,” and finding no good cause) (quotation
marks omitted); United States v D’Agata, 646 F Supp 390, 393 (ED Pa 1986):
292

Weighing these factors, I cannot bring myself to deny D’Agata a fair opportunity
to defend himself by testifying, if he wishes to do so. That would be the practical
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that a pretrial determination about the admissibility of prior
convictions for impeachment be made “whenever possible.”298 In
addition, even if trial judges are unwilling to declare a defendant’s testimony important before they know its content,299 this
Article’s proposal is that, regardless of content, defendants can
argue that their testimony is important as a means of combating
implicit stereotyping. Thus, the factor would become easier to
assess, even in advance of testimony.
B.

The Use of This Factor for Individuation Arguments Is
Worthwhile

Even once it is shown that this factor is available for the
purpose laid out in this Article, various arguments could be
made that its use for this purpose is not worthwhile. This Section responds to three variants of this objection.
1. Defendant testimony is one of several important ways of
attempting individuation.
Even if one accepts the potential benefits of individuation as
a means of combating implicit stereotyping, the argument might
be made that individuation can be accomplished just as effectively through means other than defendant testimony, and
therefore that no adjustments need to be made to the impeachment analysis. Perhaps, for example, testimony about the defendant from other witnesses, or the defendant’s own alleged
statements, could serve the purpose equally well.

effect of allowing this impeachment. . . . While I could probably wait until
D’Agata testified to decide this issue, it would be unfair to do so. The uncertainty would chill his exercising the right to testify.
See also United States v Graves, 2006 WL 1997378, *2 (ED Pa) (“Although the Court cannot anticipate what the substance of this testimony might be, the Court concludes that [the
importance] factor weighs strongly against admitting the 1993 conviction.”); United States
v O’Driscoll, 2003 WL 1401891, *2 (MD Pa) (“We cannot determine at this time the importance of O’Driscoll’s testimony. However, we assume that O’Driscoll and his counsel
consider it important that he testify. That factor weighs in favor of exclusion.”).
298 McLaughlin, Weinstein, and Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence at § 609.22
at 609-67 (cited in note 25) (“The admissibility of convictions should be determined before trial whenever possible. An advance ruling will assist counsel presenting the witness whose conviction will be introduced to make appropriate tactical decisions, including, for example, how to handle the opening statement or whether the witness should
testify.”) (citation omitted).
299 See, for example, Campbell, 2009 WL 595980 at *5. See also text accompanying
notes 106–09.
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This Article is not asserting that in every case—or even in
every case in which implicit stereotypes threaten the presumption of innocence—defendants should testify. It is certainly true
that, at least according to conventional wisdom, nothing brings
the defendant to life as an individual as effectively as his or her
testimony,300 and individuating information other than defendant testimony may struggle to meet the relevance requirement.301 But defense attorneys do and should seek other means
of bringing their clients to life as individuals in the courtroom,302
whether through voir dire,303 through evidence other than defendant testimony,304 or through their interactions with their clients.305 And social-cognition research supports the idea that individuation can be accomplished through means other than an
individual narrative from a stereotyped individual. In some
studies, for example, an individual narrative about, rather than
from, a stereotyped individual helped to lessen the effects of stereotypes on the participants’ judgments of that individual.306 Thus,

300

See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1451–52 (cited in note 88).
See FRE 401.
302 See, for example, Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1023–42 (cited in note
180) (offering examples of ways in which creative defense lawyers can address implicit
racial bias, including “motions practice, voir dire, use of experts, narrative, jury instructions, and sentencing advocacy”).
303 See H. Mitchell Caldwell and Adrienne M. Hewitt, Shades of Guilt: Combating
the Continuing Influence upon Jury Selection of Racial Stereotyping in Post-Batson Trials, 38 Am J Trial Advoc 67, 103–16 (2014) (offering techniques available during voir
dire, the opening statement, and the direct examination of the defendant that can be
used to combat racial stereotypes, in light of the fact that “the optimal method of breaking down a stereotypic view of an outgroup member by members of an ingroup, is to
identify individual aspects of the outgroup member’s character that exist beyond racial
identification”); id at 112–13 (providing a sample direct examination that aims “to identify individual aspects of the outgroup member’s character beyond any [ ] racial identification” and, specifically, that “probes aspects of [the] client’s life that help identify [him] as
an individual rather than just as a black male”).
304 See Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good Character Evidence to
Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U Pitt L Rev 227, 257–58 (2004) (discussing the
value of character evidence introduced through other witnesses).
305 See id at 257.
306 See, for example, Kenneth R. Chapman, Donald P. Tashkin, and David J. Pye,
Gender Bias in the Diagnosis of COPD, 119 Chest 1691, 1692–93 (2001) (finding that
gender differences in the diagnosis of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, a disease
more commonly diagnosed in men, were greatly decreased when physicians were provided with objective spirometry data in addition to patient-reported symptoms); Locksley, et
al, 39 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 826–31 (cited in note 254) (describing a study in
which participants were provided with a brief description of a single behavioral event,
and in which the effect of sex stereotypes on trait attributions virtually disappeared
when that brief description contained relevant information).
301
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defendant testimony is not the only way of attempting individuation but is an important tool in an important tool set.
2. The risks do not outweigh the benefits.
Another possible objection is that this proposal offers only
limited benefit, and that the benefit is outweighed by the risk.
To start with the limited benefit, it is undeniable that neither
this proposal nor any other can be a panacea. Stereotypes are
enforced daily, in a variety of ways: as Professor Kang puts it,
they “come from our experiences with other people, some of them
direct (i.e., real-world encounters) but most of them vicarious
(i.e., relayed to us through stories, books, movies, media, and
culture).”307 They run rampant in the criminal courtroom.308 The
proposals in this Article are envisaged as part of a multifaceted
strategy to combat implicit stereotypes in criminal trials.309 For
example, the provision of individuating information is most likely to succeed in combating implicit stereotyping when it is combined with other techniques, such as the provision of information about implicit bias310 and efforts to inspire internal
motivation to combat it.311 An earlier article by this author laid
out a possible method by which juror education might both impart information about implicit bias and inspire internal motivation to address it,312 and the proposals in this Article are presented as a complement to—rather than a substitute for—that
educational proposal.313
307

Kang, Implicit Bias at *1 (cited in note 159).
See, for example, Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 835–38 (cited in note 161) (describing how judges, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and jury members harbor implicit biases).
309 See Rapping, 16 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 1042 (cited in note 180) (“Educating
people in the system about their implicit biases and hoping they will be motivated to address them is a long term strategy, and only one part of a badly needed, comprehensive
solution.”).
310 See Fazio and Olson, 54 Ann Rev Psychology at 319 (cited in note 165) (“[M]odels
of correction processes require that individuals be aware of a potential bias in order to
engage in effortful correction.”) (citation omitted).
311 See Monteith, Sherman, and Devine, 2 Personality & Soc Psychology Rev at 72
(cited in note 208) (“One factor that strongly influences the likelihood of individuation is
the perceiver’s degree of motivation to form accurate, nonstereotypical impressions.”);
Borgida, Rudman, and Manteufel, 51 J Soc Issues at 187 (cited in note 205) (“[U]nless
perceivers are especially motivated to attend carefully to target persons, stereotypes
seem to have priority over individuating information in forming impressions of other
people.”).
312 Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 857–75 (cited in note 161).
313 For a discussion of similarly complementary proposals, see Devine, et al, 48 J
Experimental Soc Psychology at 1270–71 (cited in note 233) (exploring a multifaceted
308
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As for risk, skeptics may worry that even though stereotypes affect assessments of silent defendants, they may wreak
still more havoc if defendants talk: everything that defendants
say, and the ways in which they say it, could potentially inspire
or confirm stereotypes.314 It is certainly true that individuating
information is not the uncomplicated cure-all that some of the
literature has suggested.315 Research does indeed indicate that
stereotypes can affect assessments of individuating information
just as they affect assessments of individuals316 and that this is
particularly true when the individuating information is ambiguous.317 In addition, if individuating information about a stereotyped
individual reveals areas of disagreement between that individual
and the audience, stereotypes can return to mind and may shape
intervention to help people reduce implicit biases, in which the various strategies, including individuation, are “mutually reinforcing”). See also Nelson, Acker, and Manis, 32
J Experimental Soc Psychology at 35–36 (cited in note 230) (“We suspect that extensive
exposure to vivid and diagnostic individuating information may eventually weaken the
effect of a stereotype. This transformation may be encouraged if the social perceiver is
aware of the potential power of stereotypes to guide his or her thinking in undesirable
ways.”).
314 See Glick, Zion, and Nelson, 55 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 179 (cited in
note 237) (noting that “[i]ndividuating information that is consistent with stereotypes
about the social group to which an [individual] belongs may lead others to perceive that
individual as a prototypical representative” of that group and that, since the prototype
“may be a more extreme version” of the general stereotype, “[t]his type of individuating
information may be counter-productive”).
315 See, for example, Laurie A. Rudman, Peter Glick, and Julie E. Phelan, From the Laboratory to the Bench: Gender Stereotyping Research in the Courtroom, in Eugene Borgida
and Susan T. Fiske, eds, Beyond Common Sense: Psychological Science in the Courtroom
83, 95 (Blackwell 2008) (“[T]argets are seldom ‘purely’ personalized (i.e., judged without
reference to stereotypes), in part because gender categories influence how perceivers elicit, interpret, and recall individuating information.”); Borgida, Rudman, and Manteufel,
51 J Soc Issues at 184 (cited in note 205) (describing research that “disputes the earlier
view that stereotypes are eliminated in the face of any individuating information”) (emphasis added).
316 See Borgida, Rudman, and Manteufel, 51 J Soc Issues at 185 (cited in note 205)
(“The heuristic approach [ ] predicts that categorical information will automatically, perhaps even unintentionally, influence social judgments despite the presence of individuating information because the personal data available will be interpreted differently, depending on the stereotype evoked.”). See also Kunda and Sherman-Williams, 19
Personality & Soc Psychology Bull at 91 (cited in note 207) (“Even the unconscious activation of a negative stereotype of Blacks may affect the subsequent interpretation of ambiguously aggressive behavior.”); id at 98 (“The fact that impressions of individuals are
often based solely on individuating information does not necessarily mean that, in such
cases, inaccurate stereotypes will have no impact on judgment. They may still affect impressions through the construal of individuating information.”).
317 See Kunda and Sherman-Williams, 19 Personality & Soc Psychology Bull at 97 (cited in note 207) (“Subjects given ambiguous information, whose impressions were affected by
stereotypes, [ ] relied only on the individuating information. But the individuating information that they had in mind was construed differently depending on the stereotype.”).
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impressions.318 This Article does not argue that defendants should
testify in every case in which they are the target of stereotypes
that threaten the presumption of innocence or the right to a fair
trial. Rather, it proposes that the “importance of the defendant’s
testimony” factor be restored as an avenue for arguments that
defendant testimony can aid truth-finding, and it offers individuation as one topic that such arguments could address. Potential
benefits in this context will always be partial, but they outweigh
the risks.
3. This proposal does not impose an unfair burden on the
prosecution.
A final objection that might be made is that even though the
change proposed is a modest one in terms of its operability—no
new structures or factors need to be implemented—it has excessive reach in that too many trials will be affected. First, a large
proportion of criminal defendants have felony records.319 Second,
prosecutors strive to use defendants’ prior convictions as impeachment material in the vast bulk of cases that offer them
that opportunity.320 Third, defendants will be able to argue in a
great many cases that they are likely to be the targets of negative implicit stereotypes.321 It might be argued that making it
easier for a large proportion of defendants to testify, and thus,
potentially, to be acquitted,322 would impose an unfair burden on
the prosecution.
First, it is no bad thing if a more robust set of arguments
opposing impeachment by prior conviction gives prosecutors
pause before they proffer prior convictions for this purpose.
Prosecutors tend to take every opportunity that they can to seek

318 See Kunda, et al, 82 J Personality & Soc Psychology at 289 (cited in note 240)
(“[T]he Black stereotype was activated for participants who had disagreed with the Black
person but not for participants who had agreed with him.”).
319 See Cohen and Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants at *1 (cited in note 146) (indicating that in 2006, 43 percent of state felony defendants in the seventy-five largest counties in the country had a felony-conviction record).
320 See Natapoff, 80 NYU L Rev at 1461 (cited in note 88) (noting that over 70 percent of defendants who testify are subjected to prior conviction impeachment).
321 As stated earlier, implicit biases exist along multiple dimensions. See notes 18,
274; Roberts, 44 Conn L Rev at 849 (cited in note 161).
322 See Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?]
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L Rev 637, 666 (1991) (discussing a subset
of cases in which “failure to take the stand is utterly disastrous, spelling the difference
between conviction and acquittal”).
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impeachment by prior conviction.323 Some have even suggested
that prosecutors may hope that the fact finder will use such convictions for improper purposes.324 As explored in prior work by
this author, the use of prior convictions to impeach criminal defendants brings more harm than benefit to the fact-finding process, and the harm should lead prosecutors to inquire whether
the frequent proffering of prior convictions is in accord with
their ethical duty to do justice.325
Second, it is also no bad thing if this Article’s proposal disrupts the ease with which those who are the targets of implicit
racial stereotypes are convicted. Convictions are viewed as the
benchmark of successful prosecution,326 and obstacles in the path
to conviction can help shift prosecutorial incentives, or at least
raise prosecutorial awareness.327 It is no bad thing, in other
words, that a proposal such as this may heighten awareness of
the fact that current patterns of prosecution track the historical
lines of subordination that lie at the root of implicit racial stereotypes.328 It is no bad thing that a proposal such as this may play
a part in helping to shift the incentives operating on prosecutors, the most powerful participants in the criminal-justice system,329 as they make decisions about who will be prosecuted and

323

See text accompanying notes 133–34, 320.
See, for example, Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” versus “What Was Done”: When to
Admit Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 NC L Rev 939, 961–62 (2001) (“It may
indeed be the hope of unfair prejudice that motivates the prosecution to introduce such
evidence.”); Bellin, 42 UC Davis L Rev at 296 (cited in note 101) (discussing scholarship
asserting that prosecutors intend that the evidence be used for propensity purposes).
325 See Roberts, 55 BC L Rev at 600–03 (cited in note 87). See also Berger v United
States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935) (stating that the interest of the government in a criminal
prosecution “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done”).
326 See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
Cardozo L Rev 2089, 2091 (2010) (“[C]onvictions are the lodestar by which prosecutors tend
to be judged.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand L Rev 45, 58–59 (1991) (“[B]ecause [a prosecutor’s]
success is measured by her conviction rate, she may be tempted to ignore the rights of defendants, victims, or the community in order to obtain pleas or guilty verdicts.”) (citation
omitted); Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50
Tex L Rev 629, 647 (1972) (“[A]lthough it has often been contended that policemen ‘count’
arrests and not convictions, the same thing cannot be said of prosecutors.”).
327 For an exploration of the influence of litigation costs on prosecutorial behavior,
see Alschuler, 50 Tex L Rev at 646–47 (cited in note 326). See also Roberts, 98 Minn L
Rev at 637–38 (cited in note 284) (discussing proposals to adjust prosecutorial incentives
in an effort to bring about reform and increase awareness).
328 See Roberts, 98 Minn L Rev at 637–38 (cited in note 284).
329 See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev 1049, 1078–
79 (2013) (noting that the prosecutor “holds many if not most of the cards, and that
324
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brought to trial. If a blossoming of persuasive arguments about
how the testimony of criminal defendants is vitally important in
all those many cases in which the defendants are stereotyped as
criminally inclined adds a little impetus to the urgency of addressing the causes of disparity in prosecution,330 then so much
the better.
CONCLUSION
Prior conviction impeachment analysis has lost sight of one
of its foundational factors: the importance of the defendant’s testimony as a means of enhancing the truth-finding function of a
trial. Confusion in this factor’s application has left it, in the eyes
of many, a distraction from the real issues at trial. This factor,
however, is more central than ever. Fact finders are now known
to harbor implicit racial stereotypes that in many instances
threaten the presumption of innocence and that individuating
information offers some hope of ameliorating. Rather than allowing the factor to remain dormant and allowing defendants to
sit mute because of fears of the impeachment that has become
the default, this Article urges that the factor be revivified. If
courts consider the importance of the defendant’s testimony as a
means of combating implicit stereotypes, both truth-finding and
the presumption of innocence become a little more achievable.

therefore it makes sense to impose on those powerful players greater responsibilities for
the overall integrity of the system”).
330 See Besiki Kutateladze, Whitney Tymas, and Mary Crowley, Race and Prosecution
in Manhattan *3 (Vera Institute of Justice, July 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/RCU6
-ZFXN (finding race to be a factor in case outcomes). Note also the influence that prosecutors can exercise over arrest patterns, with a goal of reducing the racial disparity that currently exists therein. See Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment at *38 (cited in note 211)
(recommending more-equitable enforcement policies, particularly for drug crimes); Heath,
Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates (cited in note 270); NYU School of Law, New Frontiers in
Race and Criminal Justice—Panel 2: Race and Prosecution 29:58–31:07 (Apr 17, 2012),
online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUtgqDaJN_g#t=29m58s (visited Nov 21, 2015)
(Perma archive unavailable) (showing Whitney Tymas saying: “Prosecutors need to understand the real leadership that they can exercise when it comes to not endorsing all police
action. . . . [I]t’s really OK to tell a police officer, ‘I’m not . . . prosecuting this case.’ . . .
[P]rosecutors can say no, and . . . not just be case processors—really be leaders.”); Delgado,
80 Va L Rev at 530 (cited in note 270) (describing racial disparities in the criminaljustice system).

